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 SUMMARY* 
Central and East European countries have expressed strong fears about Russian gas but did 
little to reduce dependence. However, recently some progress has been made in the 
diversification and increasing security of supply. The Russo–Ukrainian gas crisis in early 2009, 
together with the period since 2008, help to illustrate the different opportunities each country 
faces, i.e. to what extent they could have taken advantage of the benefits of the changed market 
environment. For the Central and East European consumers, the focus is mainly on pricing, 
and the anti-trust probe launched by the European Commission against Gazprom stresses the 
crucial importance of this issue. Despite much criticism, the EU has taken a few steps that may 
help mitigate the fear of Russian influence. 
The paper is arranged into five main sections. After a short introduction, Section 2 presents 
the gas market changes that have occurred over the last four to five years. Supply- and 
demand-side dynamics combined with the pricing evolution have been seriously affecting 
Gazprom’s market position in Europe. I shall examine how Russia has responded to these 
challenges, with a special emphasis on the Central and East European region.  
Section 3 investigates the role of gas in primary energy consumption in the Central and East 
European countries and the change in gas demand. Here, different gas demand scenarios are 
compared. The issues of domestic gas production, including unconventional and offshore gas 
resources, and the degree of self-sufficiency are also key questions.  
Section 4 addresses the issue of transit through the western Commonwealth of Independent 
States and Central and Eastern Europe. Bypass pipelines have already begun to affect transit 
and will create a large additional capacity. I argue that bypass pipelines may increase the 
security of supply. Here and elsewhere in the paper, attention also turns to the EU’s Third 
Energy Package. 
In Section 5, the role of Russian gas in Central and Eastern Europe (consisting of both EU 
Member States and Energy Community Contracting Parties) is examined country by country, 
emphasising the gas supply portfolios, and existing and planned physical infrastructure. 
Finally, before concluding, diversification projects in the Southern Corridor are discussed 
separately in Section 6. I argue that by the end of this decade, gas from the second stage of 
Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field development could reach Europe.  
                                                 
* Based on information up to 25 October 2012. This paper was commissioned by Central European University’s 
Center for EU Enlargement Studies and Sabanci University’s Istanbul Policy Center and will appear in a volume of 
theirs. The paper has not been updated, but certain corrections and adjustments have been made.  
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1) INTRODUCTION1 
It has been conventional wisdom to talk 
about Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
dependence on Russian gas imports and the 
western Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS)2 as transit routes. But despite the 
common past, the CEE region is not totally 
homogeneous. The 13 gas importing 
countries3 of Central and Eastern Europe 
have different conditions. They are 
dependent on gas, gas imports and Russian 
gas to a different extent. A central question 
is the extent to which a country’s domestic 
gas production can meet its demand. 
Besides, other major elements need to be 
looked at: through how many pipelines and 
from how many directions a country can 
receive gas; which transit pipelines pass 
through it (if any); whether the country has 
a seashore to make use of terminals to 
regasify liquefied natural gas (LNG); and 
                                                 
1 When talking about the European gas market, one 
should understand what is meant by Europe. One 
may think of the EU27, the OECD Europe or – and 
this is what I will do – the countries stretching from 
the Atlantic Ocean to the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (see Honoré, 2010: xxvi–xxvii, 
xxxvii). Gazprom considers Europe to consist of 
countries beyond the former Soviet Union. The Rus-
sian terminology distinguishes between ‘far abroad’ 
and ‘near abroad.’ Russian statistics regard ‘far 
abroad’ as areas beyond the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States, while Gazprom looks on them as 
countries other than the former Soviet Union. The 
measurement of gas volume is another key problem. 
The terms ’demand’ and ’consumption’ without defi-
nitions also can be misleading. In this study, the 
quantity of natural gas is given in (billion) cubic 
metres. However, the standards differ from the Inter-
national Energy Agency (IEA) to BP and the former 
Soviet Union to the European countries. The abbre-
viations used for units of measurement in this study 
are: bcm – billion cubic metres; bcma – billion cubic 
metres per annum; mmcm – million cubic metres; 
mcm – thousand cubic metres; mmtpa – millions of 
tonnes per annum. 
2 Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. 
3 These are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bul-
garia, Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Macedonia. Croatia did not extend its long-term gas 
supply contract with Russia when it expired at the 
end of 2010. Among the Central and East European 
countries, Albania and Montenegro (and Kosovo) do 
not import gas at all. They have no import capacity.  
what the capacity of the particular country’s 
underground gas storage(s) is.4 
The Russo–Ukrainian gas crisis in 
January 2009 showed exactly the conditions 
of the Central and East European states and 
the achievements in improving the security 
of supply at that time. South-East Europe 
suffered very badly, but in Central Europe, 
Slovakia was also strongly affected by the 
gas crisis. Under these circumstances, the 
then and now Slovak Prime Minister Robert 
Fico proposed restarting the second block of 
the Bohunice nuclear power plant that had 
been shut down only a short time prior to 
the crisis as an anti-crisis measure. Bulgaria, 
which had been hit even more dramatically, 
also hinted that it could re-open one of its 
units at the Kozloduy nuclear power plant.5 
Since 2005, several gas supply contracts 
have been signed or extended with Gazp-
rom6 in the CEE region, but some contracts 
will have expired already at the beginning 
and in the middle of the 2010’s. Before the 
extension of these contracts, it is important 
to see how much Russian gas will be need, 
and in order to enjoy a better bargaining 
position, it would be necessary to show 
progress in diversification projects. 
2) MARKET CHANGES IN EUROPE, 
WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION                     
TO THE PRICING, THE CEE REGION                
AND GAZPROM 
In the last four to five years, the global gas 
market picture has changed significantly, 
                                                 
4 The issue of underground gas storage facilities is 
not analysed here, while emphasising the importance 
of them. Among Gazprom’s customers in the region, 
there are no gas storage facilities in Estonia, Lithua-
nia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, 
while in Serbia it was put into commercial operation 
in 2011. 
5 EurActiv.com. 12 January 2009. 
http://www.euractiv.com/energy/gas-crisis-gives-
slovakia-excuse-news-221021. 
6 Gazprom or its 100 per cent owned subsidiaries 
have the exclusive right to export gas or LNG 
produced in Russia. In principle, this monopoly does 
not apply to production-sharing agreements (PSA), 
but Gazprom has successfully prevented the 
Sakhalin-1 PSA project to export gas to China. 
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although these events affected various 
regions differently. Several factors have 
been shaping the process. Among the most 
important are the following: the onset and 
the effects of the economic crisis; the sharp 
rise in unconventional gas production (most 
importantly the shale gas revolution in the 
US); and the surge in liquefied natural gas 
production and globalising gas markets. 
Before the economic crisis, European gas 
customers were working to sign or extend 
long-term gas supply contracts with Gazp-
rom, thus to ensure themselves for 20 to 30 
years. When oil prices surged in July 2008 
to a record level, Gazprom head Alexei Mil-
ler expected oil prices to rise to USD 250 a 
barrel, and, consequently, gas prices to spike 
to USD 1,000 per mcm.7; 8 
A few months later, a totally different 
situation was found in the gas market. In 
2009, gas demand declined sharply in Eu-
rope. As a consequence of the oversupply, 
the spot market gas prices have fallen well 
below oil product-indexed prices in long-
term gas supply contracts. Moreover, after 
having recovered from a downward spiral, 
oil prices have remained (relatively) high. In 
such a situation, the role of gas trading hubs 
and their prices started to grow. Since the 
end of 2008, the so-called “two price” or 
“hybrid price” market has been seen.9  
All these mean that Gazprom’s European 
customers have needed less and cheaper 
gas, facing take or pay problems and their 
consequences. In 2009, gas demand was 
determined by the economic crisis in Euro-
pe, with gas consumption falling by 7 per 
cent. In 2010, the cold weather was a huge 
plus, and helped to push demand to 6 per 
cent above the 2009 level. The year 2011 
was characterised by warm weather, and 
gas demand fell by 8 per cent.10 In early 
2012, the gas demand shock in Europe 
attracted attention. But despite this, gas 
consumption is projected to decrease again 
in 2012.11 In 2011, three additional factors 
                                                 
7 Reuters. 3 July 2008.  http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2008/07/03/gazprom-gas-prices-idUSL034 
1241220080703. 
8 In Continental Europe, gas prices in the long-term 
gas supply contracts are mainly linked to oil product 
prices and a take or pay requirement, meaning a 
minimum purchase obligation, is imposed.  
9 Stern–Rogers (2011). 
10 Stern (2012). 
11 Dow Jones Newswires. 1 October 2012. 
deserved serious attention: the temporary 
suspension of Libya’s gas exports, the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster and its 
subsequent decisions on nuclear power 
plants. At present, apart from the weather 
conditions, European gas demand is driven 
by the problems of economic growth, the 
(relatively) high gas prices, the strong 
growth of renewables and the extremely low 
CO2 prices.12 As the IEA claims, during 
2011, neither long-term nor spot-indexed 
gas was in a position to compete with coal as 
the marginal source for base-load 
generation, in part due to a significant drop 
in CO2 prices.13 Gas price movements in the 
US have had a significant impact on coal 
consumption in Europe. “Because of coal’s 
replacement by gas in the US, more coal is 
being exported to the EU, because of weak 
[carbon reduction] targets and because the 
gas prices are very high here.”14 
Gas exports outside the former Soviet 
Union15 by Gazprom Export, a 100 per cent 
owned subsidiary of Gazprom, fell sharply 
in 2009 (from 158.8 bcm in 2008 to 140.6 
bcm in 2009), in which the lower gas 
demand, high contract prices and gas 
interruption during the Russo–Ukrainian 
gas crisis in January 2009 also played a role. 
2010 brought a slight further decline before 
soaring in 2011 (from 138.6 bcm in 2010 
to 150.0 bcm in 2011), still far below the 
2008 level.  
In 2011, the EU’s main external source of 
supply was Russia, representing 24 per cent 
of the EU’s gas consumption. Other major 
sources were Norway (19%), Algeria (9%) 
and Qatar (7%).16 In 2010, European LNG 
imports increased significantly, and then 
declined slightly in 2011.17 In 2012, a 
                                                 
12 IEA (2012c); IEA (2012b). 
13 IEA (2012b): 142. 
14 Stephan Singer of WWF for Natural Gas Europe 
(28 November 2012, http://www.naturalgaseurope 
.com/shale-gas-environmentalist-perspective). 
15 This gas belongs to Gazprom’s gas balance (or 
produced/owned by Gazprom) and is sold under 
long-term gas supply contracts. In this paper, I shall 
not analyse the causes of differences between data 
taken from the Russian customs statistics and various 
Gazprom sources. 
16 Eurogas – Press Release. 29 March 2012. 
http://www.eurogas.org/uploaded/Eurogas%20pres
s%20release%20on%20More%20customers,%20cons
uming%20less%20gas,%20in%202011.pdf 
17 IEA (2011a): 186; IEA (2012b): 104. My 
calculations based on IEA (2012c) show that after 
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considerable drop is expected to follow as 
Asian demand has been pulling gas away 
from Europe.18 
According to the collection of the daily 
newspaper Vedomosti, in 2011, Macedonia 
paid the highest price for Russian gas (USD 
462 per mcm), while the lowest price was 
paid by Armenia (USD 180). In the CEE 
region, Slovakia was offered the lowest price 
(USD 333), which was even lower than that 
for Moldova (USD 338). In 2010, it still did 
not reach the same level. Besides Slovakia, 
Slovenia was the only one in the CEE region 
for whom the gas price (USD 377) was 
lower than for Germany (USD 379). Bosnia-
Herzegovina bought gas for USD 429, 
Poland for USD 420 and the Czech Republic 
for USD 419, paying record high prices 
among all the customers of Gazprom. 
Bulgaria purchased gas for USD 391, Hun-
gary for USD 383 and Romania for USD 
380. For the Baltic States, only one price was 
given by Vedomosti at USD 397.19 
Because of the take or pay provision, the 
customers have had to seriously think about 
what would happen to those gas amounts 
that had not (yet) been taken within a given 
contract year. In 2009, almost all customers 
of Gazprom Export outside the former Soviet 
Union bought less gas than in 2008. In 
terms of volume, Germany, Turkey and 
Italy, the three main customers, lowered 
their purchases the most. In 2009, Poland 
was the only one, which, after the removal 
of the controversial Russo–Ukrainian 
intermediary company Rosukrenergo (see 
below), increased its imports, and 
significantly so, while Switzerland took 
roughly the same amount as in 2008. In 
2010, Poland became the fourth largest 
customer of Gazprom Export outside the 
former Soviet Union, ahead of France, and 
                                                                          
experiencing extremely high growth rates both in 
2009 and 2010, LNG imports increased very slightly 
in 2011. Also, according to my calculations, BP data 
indicates similar trends but with higher growth rates. 
GIIGNL, the International Group of Liquefied Natural 
Gas Importers, reported a very small increase in 
imports in 2011 as well. 
18 Reuters. 9 August 2012. http://in.reuters.com/ 
article/2012/08/09/energy-lng-idINL6E8J9CA820 
120809 
19 Vedomosti (18 June 2012). Naturally, various 
averages are given for the other cases as well. No 
data was provided for Serbia. 
still retains that position.20 Italy, the third 
largest importer of Russian gas after 
Germany and Turkey, was seriously 
impacted in 2010. In 2010, Turkey also 
significantly reduced gas purchases from 
Russia, but to a much lesser extent. 
However, in 2011, Turkey and Italy 
accounted for the bulk of the increase. Italy 
took more gas from Russia to make up for a 
shortfall from Libya.21 To be more precise, 
the closure of the Libyan–Italian 
Greenstream gas pipeline allowed Italy’s ENI 
to replace Libyan supplies with pre-paid gas 
from Gazprom.22 
In 2011, 25.3 per cent of gas exports by 
Gazprom Export outside the former Soviet 
Union went to ten Central and East European 
states. This volume (accounting for 38 bcm of 
gas) is more than 10 per cent below the 2008 
level, but if Croatia is excluded from this 
figure, then it is almost 8 per cent below the 
2008 volume. Besides Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovakia are among 
the large customers. In 2011, apart from 
Poland and Macedonia, all countries bought 
less gas from Gazprom than in 2008. 
Since 2010, Gazprom has granted 
various concessions regarding the long-term 
gas supply contracts. In the region, several 
companies have agreed to the terms of a 
price reduction. In December 2010, Latvia 
and Estonia were offered to lower prices by 
15 per cent in 2011, provided they increase 
gas consumption to the levels of 2007 (i.e. 
to pre-crisis levels).23 Since July 2011, im-
port prices for Hungary’s E.ON Földgáz 
Trade, which is still a subsidiary of 
Germany’s E.ON Ruhrgas, have been 
                                                 
20 As to Gazprom Group’s total sales in Europe, Po-
land and France had already changed places in 2009, 
but in 2009 and 2011, gas sales to the UK exceeded 
those achieved in Poland. 
21 Financial Times. 16 February 2012.  
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2e57f4c4-58ad-
11e1-9f28-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1oivhTm7f. 
22 ICIS Heren. 3 March 2011. http://www.icis.com 
/heren/articles/2011/03/03/9440628/gazprom-
counts-on-rue-gas-as-production-falls,-exports-
soar.html. 
23 RIA Novosti (24 December 2010, http://en.rian.ru 
/business/20101224/161916344.html). According 
to the 2011 Annual Report of Latvijas Gāze, the Lat-
vian incumbent, a new agreement with terms and 
conditions similar to those of the previous supply 
contract was also signed for 2012. See below for 
more details on the gas supply contracts of each 
Baltic country. 
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reduced.24 In 2011, SPP of Slovakia was 
among the companies whose prices were 
revised. In December 2011, Serbia achieved 
a 12 per cent price cut for 2012.25 In 2012, 
Bulgaria received a price discount of 11 per 
cent from April 2012 until the end of 
2012.26  
In the CEE region, price disputes of RWE 
Transgas, the Czech subsidiary of Germany’s 
RWE, the PGNiG of Poland and the 
Lithuanian Energy Ministry with the Gazp-
rom Group are to be resolved via 
arbitration, respectively.27 After the deal 
with E.ON Ruhrgas in early July 2012, 
meaning the end of the arbitration 
procedure, Gazprom declared that it had 
defended its price model.28 But Jonathan 
Stern (of the Oxford Institute of Energy 
Studies) believes Gazprom is fighting a 
losing battle to preserve its oil-linked 
contracts. “Europe is moving to hub-based 
pricing, and that means Gazprom is as 
well.”29  
Gazprom responded to the market 
processes too late, and has lost its market 
share in Europe.30 However, from the point 
of view of Gazprom, priority is given to 
revenue generation and not to the export 
volumes. In 2011, 58 per cent of the gas 
sold in Europe was under an oil-linked for-
mula, but due to renegotiations and 
arbitration cases, this ratio has been 
falling.31 According to late 2011 and early 
                                                 
24 Horváth (2011): 15. 
25 According to media information, this addendum 
will be in place until the new long-term contract is 
signed. Kommersant. 24 February 2012.  
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc-rss/1879271 
26 The 11 per cent figure is an average for the three 
contracts of Bulgaria (with Gazprom Export, WIEE 
and Overgaz, see below). Ministry of Economy, En-
ergy and Tourism of the Republic of Bulgaria – News. 
28 August 2012. http://www.mi.government.bg 
/en/news/delyan-dobrev-otstapkata-ot-11-ot-
cenata-na-gaza-e-v-sila-ot-1-vi-april-do-kraya-na-
godinata-830.html 
27 After completing this study, PGNiG secured a deal 
with Gazprom. 
28 Reuters. 5 July 2012. http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2012/07/05/us-energy-gas-europe-
gazprom-idUSBRE8640FN20120705 
29 Financial Times. 16 February 2012.  
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2e57f4c4-58ad-
11e1-9f28-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1oivhTm7f 
30 Konoplyanik (2012). 
31 Natural Gas Europe. 13 September 2012.  
http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/shale-gas-
needed-for-fully-functioning-eu-gas-market 
2012 information, Gazprom supplies only 7 
per cent of its total gas exports to Europe at 
spot rates.32 
There was a serious warning for Gazp-
rom when at the end of September 2011, in 
order to investigate the possibility of 
anticompetitive practices, the European 
Commission officials undertook 
unannounced inspections at the premises of 
the companies active in the supply, 
transmission and storage of gas in several 
EU Member States, mainly in Central and 
Eastern Europe.33 A year later, in early 
September 2012, the European Commission 
launched an anti-trust probe against Gazp-
rom. The Commission is investigating three 
suspected anti-competitive practices in 
Central and Eastern Europe, involving 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria.34 
Firstly, Gazprom may have divided gas 
markets by hindering the free flow of gas 
across Member States. Secondly, Gazprom 
may have prevented the diversification of 
the supply of gas. Finally, Gazprom may 
have imposed unfair prices on its customers 
by linking the price of gas to oil prices.35 But 
                                                 
32 This data is derived from Gazprom’s 2011 Novem-
ber Base Prospectus and reiterated by Alexander 
Medvedev (of Gazprom) in Gazprom’s Investor Day 
in London on 14 February 2012 (Gazprom, 2012). 
However, we understand that this figure has 
increased since then. 
33 European Commission – Press Release. 
MEMO/11/641, 27 September 2011.  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-
641_en.htm?locale=en. 
34 European Commission – Press Release (IP/12/937, 
4 September 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/937&form
at= 
HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en); 
Bloomberg (4 September 2012,  
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-
04/gazprom-faces-eu-antitrust-probe-on-eastern-
european-gas-sales.html) 
35 In response, on 11 September 2012, President 
Putin signed an executive order, which says that 
“open joint stock companies on the list of strategic 
enterprises and their subsidiaries should supply in-
formation on their activities (unless such information 
must be published or disclosed in any case) upon 
request from the authorities and agencies of foreign 
countries, international organisations, associations 
and groups of foreign countries, only subject to prior 
consent of a respective federal executive body 
authorised by the Russian Government. The same 
procedure shall apply if the aforementioned eco-
nomic actors make amendments to contracts con-
cluded with foreign counteragents and other such 
documents pertaining to their business (pricing) 
9 
as for Lithuania, one and a half years before 
the anti-trust investigation started, in 
January 2011, Lithuania’s Ministry of 
Energy had launched a complaint to the 
European Commission requesting to 
investigate the abuse of dominant position 
by Gazprom.36 It was while Günther 
Oettinger, the EU energy commissioner, was 
in Lithuania that in mid-September 2012 he 
emphasised that Russian gas prices to the EU 
Member States should not vary greatly.37  
In the first half of the 2000’s, the 
Directorate-General for Competition (DG 
COMP) was taking steps to remove the 
territorial restrictions (‘destination clauses’) 
from the gas supply contracts concluded by 
Gazprom with a number of gas wholesalers 
in the EU. They found mutually acceptable 
alternatives with ENI, OMV (of Austria) and 
E.ON Ruhrgas, and in June 2005, the Euro-
pean Commission ceased its review of Gazp-
rom’s contracts. After that, Gazprom 
declared that they no longer included such 
clauses in new contracts with companies 
organised under the laws of a Member State 
of the EU (’EU companies’).38 Now, the issue 
of lifting the ban on gas re-export can also 
receive attention in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope.39 
                                                                          
policy in foreign countries, or for the purposes of 
alienating their shares and stakes in foreign entities, 
rights to conduct business activity on foreign soil, 
and titles to real estate located abroad, should the 
above actions be accomplished on demand of the 
abovementioned organisations, bodies and groups. 
The Executive Order states that the authorised fed-
eral executive body must refuse to grant its consent 
to these actions to proceed if they could harm Rus-
sia’s economic interests.” (Executive order on meas-
ures protecting Russian interests in Russian legal 
entities’ foreign economic activities. 11 September 
2012. http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/4401#sel=.) 
36 Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Lithuania – 
News. 25 January 2011. http://www.enmin.lt/en/ 
news/detail.php?ID=1198 
37 Reuters. 14 September 2012. http://www.reuters. 
com/article/2012/09/14/eu-gas-gazprom-
idUSL5E8KE9YZ20120914 
38 European Commission (2007); Gazprom (2005); 
Gazprom (2007). 
39 I argue that the problem is also more subtle when 
it comes to the old contracts. István Kutas, then Head 
of Communications at E.ON Földgáz Trade, in reply 
to my questions said the following in early September 
2008: “Critical amounts concerning the ToP [take or 
pay] are partly exported (i.e. we do not take it from 
Baumgarten, but we sell it there), partly redirected to 
our mother company, and partly are not taken (or 
we delay the offtake).” “Our contract has not 
changed in this respect, but intra-EU trade is not 
3) GAS DEMAND AND PRODUCTION 
IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
 
3.1. Role of gas in primary energy 
consumption in Central and                 
East European countries 
The Central and East European countries40 
can be divided into three distinct groups 
based on the role of gas in primary energy 
consumption. In 2011, Hungary (38.2%) 
and Lithuania (36%) were the countries 
where gas played the biggest role in the 
primary energy consumption, but the ratio 
was also high in Latvia (33.1%), Romania 
(30.8%), Croatia (30.8%) and Slovakia 
(28.1%). In all six cases, representing the 
first group of countries, ratios were higher 
than the OECD average, and even the OECD 
Europe average. However, it was below the 
average in countries of the second group, 
comprising the Czech Republic (17.2%), 
Bulgaria (12.9%), Poland (12.6%), Slovenia 
(12%), Serbia (11.9%) and Estonia (10.1%). 
Finally, in countries such as Macedonia 
(3.3%) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (3.1%) gas 
played an extremely low role in the energy 
balance. 
Sometimes things change very quickly. 
According to my calculations based on data 
from the IEA, in 2009 it was Latvia where 
gas played the largest role in power 
generation, among the countries examined. 
(Latvia was followed by Hungary.) But at the 
end of 2009, Lithuania closed the Ignalina 
nuclear power plant, which increased the 
share of gas in electricity generation 
dramatically. From a net electricity exporter 
                                                                          
considered as export and is not, therefore, covered by 
the clause.” (These are my translations. – Cs. W.) In 
Poland, the annex which was signed in October 
2010 to the existing long-term contract, the so-
called Yamal contract of 1996 (see below), lifts the 
ban on re-export of gas to third-party countries 
without Gazprom Export’s consent. 
40 Without Montenegro and Albania, but with Croatia. 
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Lithuania became the most dependent 
country of electricity imports in the EU.41 
3.2. Gas demand 
In the CEE region, Poland (with 17.2 bcm in 
2011), Romania (14.4 bcm) and Hungary 
(11.6 bcm) are the largest gas consumers, 
with a combined share of nearly 60 per cent 
in 2011.42 In 2009, in all countries under 
review, except for Albania, gas consumption 
decreased, and in certain cases it decreased 
quite dramatically (in the order of 30 to 40 
per cent). However, in almost all countries, 
gas demand reached its peak years before 
2008.43 
Forecasts for gas demand in the Central 
and East European region are vague and 
different. From the same source for all 
countries examined (and with figures 
measured in bcm) only one forecast has 
been available for this author. Anouk 
Honoré (of the Oxford Institute of Energy 
Studies), following the IEA methodology, 
calculated in early 2010 that gas 
consumption in the 15-country region 
would rise from 77.5 bcm in 2007 (and 
75.8 bcm in 2008) to 80.5 bcm in 2020. 
This is a 4.7 bcm, or 6.2 per cent increase, 
which is predominantly due to Poland and 
Romania’s consumption growth. Honoré 
forecasts decline in half of the CEE countries 
(in Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Bulgaria, 
Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina).44 
In a report by Kantor Management 
Consultants SA in association with Booz & 
Company Ltd. that was published in early 
2012, a significant increase in consumption 
is forecast by 2020, compared to 2010 
(which is also an estimate) for the region 
comprising eight CEE countries (Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovenia). In 
the three scenarios, namely the minimum, 
base and maximum scenarios, the figures, 
respectively, are from 55.3 bcm in 2010 to 
                                                 
41 Paskevicius (2011). 
42 The data was also taken from the IEA. 
43 IEA (2008); IEA (2011b); IEA (2012c). 
44 Honoré (2010): xl, 243, 292, 293–294. 
65.8 bcm in 2020 (+14.3%), from 55.7 bcm 
in 2010 to 76.7 bcm in 2020 (+35.2%) and 
from 56.2 bcm in 2010 to 86.5 bcm in 
2020 (+42.4%).45 Honoré calculated much 
lower increases from 2010 to 2020 in the 
same eight countries. Practically, Honoré’s 
number (+14.2%) is, in relative terms, 
similar to the one set out in the above-
mentioned minimum scenario (+14.3%). In 
her predictions, all countries are expected to 
increase their consumption as well. In her 
scenario, consumption will be increased 
from 63.7 bcm in 2010 to 72.8 bcm in 
2020, of which the given date for 2010 is 
also a projection by Honoré,46 i.e. even base 
numbers (estimated or forecasted absolute 
numbers) of the two forecasts differ greatly. 
According to Honoré, in the CEE 
countries south of Hungary, only a 0.7 bcm 
of additional gas demand will be created by 
2020, compared to 2008 (from 25.4 bcm in 
2008 to 26.1 bcm in 2020). Outside 
Romania, growth will barely be noticeable, 
but rather a decrease is anticipated. In 
contrast, IHS CERA predicts 7.1 bcm of 
additional gas demand in the same countries 
(from 23.5 bcm in 2008 to 30.6 bcm in 
2020). Romania and Croatia would account 
for nearly half of the increase; nevertheless, 
all countries are assumed to have a certain 
amount of additional demand.47 
In its Ten Year Network Development 
Plan 2011–2020 (TYNDP 2011–2020), 
unveiled in February 2011, ENTSOG 
provides data for all concerned countries 
except for Bosnia-Herzegovina (and 
Albania).48 However, data is given in GWh 
(and for “final customers”).49 As regards the 
Baltic States, Latvia (-20.3%) and Lithuania’s 
                                                 
45 Kantor Management Consultants SA – Booz & 
Company Ltd. (2012). 
46 2008 data (67.1 bcm) is a factual data, while 2009 
data (60.7 bcm) is an estimate. 
47 Cited by Roberts (2012). The information came 
from a private study conducted by IHS CERA. John 
Roberts of Platts told this author that he thought the 
information dated back to 2010. 
48 Available at http://www.entsog.eu/publications/ 
tyndp?year=2011. The creation of the European 
Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas 
was initiated by the EU’s Third Energy Package. 
49 Unfortunately, the first ten-year Gas Regional 
Investment Plans, prepared in accordance with the 
EU’s Third Energy Package and published in 2012, 
provide proper time series for fewer countries. 
(Available at http://www.gie.eu/memberarea 
/purtext_entsog_GRIP.asp?wa=plus_GRIP) 
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(-15.0%) gas demand will be much lower in 
2020 than it was in 2008. Honoré also 
expects depressed demand not to return to 
the levels experienced before 2009 in these 
countries, but the magnitudes are different. 
TYNDP 2011–2020 shows growth in 
Estonia (+8.4%), while in Honoré’s 
calculations, by 2020, consumption will 
have recovered and reached the same level 
as that of 2008. In the remaining countries, 
except for Romania (-20.0%) and Bulgaria 
(-13.0%), demand is predicted to rise 
significantly by 2020. Contrary to this, as 
seen above, according to Honoré (+12.9%) 
and IHS CERA (+16.2%), Romania will see 
its gas consumption go up. But in Bulgaria, 
Honoré predicts a lower consumption level 
(-7.4%), while IHS CERA thinks that an 
increase will come (+21.9%). 
3.3. Internal gas production in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, with special 
attention to unconventional gas 
In Central and Eastern Europe, only 
Romania (with 11.0 bcm in 2011) has a 
substantial gas production, but gas 
production in Poland (6.2 bcm50), Croatia 
(2.3 bcm) and Hungary (2.8 bcm) also 
needs to be mentioned.51 Romania and 
Croatia have been largely self-sufficient in 
their natural gas supplies, with 76.4 per 
cent and 71.9 per cent of gas consumed in 
2011, respectively. Although not 
comparable to that of Romania and Croatia, 
in Poland (with 36% in 2011) and Hungary 
(24.1%) gas consumption against 
production is not negligible. This ratio is 
even lower in Serbia (16.7%) and Bulgaria 
(15.2%), while others have only a token 
degree of self-sufficiency (such as in the 
Czech Republic – 2.2%, and Slovakia – 
1.8%); it is entirely non-existent in the rest 
of the CEE region. 
Among unconventional gas resources, 
shale gas has been attracting the most 
attention. However, shale gas production 
                                                 
50 Compare with other data sources. For example, 
according to national sources, domestic gas produc-
tion was 4.3 bcm in 2011, similar to that of BP (BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy). 
51 According to IEA definition of gas production. 
will be a more difficult matter in Europe 
than in the United States. The first steps 
have been taken in the CEE region and the 
first failures have also occurred. Poland’s 
case remains the most hopeful. Nevertheless, 
recently, several negative messages have 
been received, starting with the fact that 
according to the latest assessments, shale gas 
resources might be much lower than it was 
estimated in the widely known April 2011 
report of the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) of the US Department 
of Energy. While estimates given by the 
March 2012 report of the Polish Geological 
Institute are very low-key, the report of the 
US Geological Survey (USGS) published in 
July 2012 painted an exasperating picture. 
In spite of the fact that some companies 
yielded disappointing drilling results for 
shale gas, it may be too early to draw any 
firm conclusions. As to the further negative 
messages, in June 2012 it turned out that 
the disappointed US ‘supermajor’ Exxon 
Mobil was pulling out of Poland’s shale gas 
exploration projects, although these had 
been at an early stage of the process.52 In 
Poland, the government is expected to start 
the commercial production of shale gas in 
late 2014 or early 2015. 
In Bulgaria, another US supermajor, 
Chevron’s shale gas project was not allowed 
to go ahead. In January 2012, after seeing 
lots of protests throughout the country, the 
technology of hydraulic fracturing (or 
fracking) for shale gas exploration and 
extraction was banned and Chevron’s 
exploration permit was revoked. In Poland 
(and Lithuania53), Chevron has the 
opportunity to show results. In Romania, the 
coming of the new government meant the 
end of Romania’s pro-shale gas position. A 
moratorium is effectively in place, in spite of 
the fact that so far no relevant legislation 
has been adopted to implement such 
measures.54 According to an August 2012 
                                                 
52 Natural Gas Europe. 20 June 2012. 
http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/exxonmobil-
leaves-poland-shale-gas 
53 According to information dated 25 October 2012, 
Chevron bought half of Lithuania’s LL Investicijos. 
54 Natural Gas Europe (16 August 2012, 
http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/shale-gas-
exploitation-in-romania-postponed); Dąborowski–
Groszkowski (2012); Natural Gas Europe (25 June 
2012, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/romania-
senate-rejects-fracking-ban); Transindex (21 June 
2012, http://itthon.transindex.ro/?hir=29748). 
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statement by the Romanian Minister of 
Environment and Forests, Romania will most 
likely extend the moratorium by two years 
until 2014. However, Romania’s hope is not 
shale gas, but rather gas in the Black Sea. 
Similarly, the Black Sea gas is also a new 
hope for Bulgaria.  
In the Czech Republic, a moratorium on 
shale gas exploration is expected to be put 
in place until (at least) mid-2014 as well. 
But such legislation has not yet been passed. 
In 2012, the news has not been about going 
ahead with projects, but rather about 
revoked licenses and local objections.55  
Among the Baltic States, Lithuania also 
wants to join the shale gas club. In the 
summer of 2012, Lithuania called its first 
shale gas exploration tender after a 
postponement. Moreover, there is a company 
in Lithuania (Minijos Nafta), which is 
involved in shale oil and gas exploration 
activities. Latvia also noted that it planned to 
diversify its energy sources by exploring the 
development of shale gas resources.56 But 
since then, no positive news has yet been 
released.57 
Unconventional gas in Hungary’s Makó 
Trough attracted interest, but the 
exploration drilling has been unsuccessful. 
However, Hungary’s oil and gas company 
Mol produces gas from unconventional 
reservoirs in Hungary. 
Finally, the potential of Hungary’s former 
Yugoslav neighbours for unconventional gas 
is worth mentioning, too. 
                                                 
55 Dąborowski–Groszkowski (2012). 
56 The Baltic Course (24 February 2011, 
http://www.baltic-
course.com/eng/good_for_business/?doc=37695); 
Natural Gas Europe (21 July 2011, 
http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/latvia-pursue-
shale-gas-development). 
57 news2biz. 18 October 2012. 
http://www.news2biz.com/?PublicationId=c19f59c
3-d95e-45f1-ae33-4e273d53e8bb. 
4) TRANSIT THROUGH THE WESTERN 
CIS STATES AND CENTRAL               
AND EASTERN EUROPE 
The bulk of Russian gas exports to 
consumers outside the former Soviet Union 
transits through three western CIS states, 
namely through Ukraine, Belarus and Mol-
dova. Finland is interconnected with Russia. 
A large part of Turkish exports is delivered 
via the Blue Stream pipeline in the Black Sea 
and gas deliveries via the Nord Stream 
pipeline in the Baltic Sea started in 2011. 
The gas pipelines going through Ukraine 
heading towards Europe follow the route of 
Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and 
Moldova. Gas travelling through Moldova 
flows to Romania and onwards. Belarus 
provides transit services in the direction of 
Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine. In 2011, 
101 bcm of gas transited to Europe through 
Ukraine, while 44 bcm through Belarus and 
nearly 20 bcm through Moldova. Among 
the three western CIS transit states, Gazp-
rom owns the Belarusian section of the 
Yamal-Europe pipeline, carrying Russian 
gas to Poland and Germany (and onwards), 
and the trunk gas pipeline network of 
Belarus’ Beltransgaz. In Moldova, Gazprom 
holds half of shares in Moldovagaz, 
including transmission pipelines. In 
Ukraine, Gazprom has no such position.  
After the expiration of their agreement at 
the end of 2011, Moldovagaz did not 
succeed in signing new, long(er)-term gas 
supply and transit contracts with Gazprom. 
Instead, existing contracts were extended 
several times, the last time until the end of 
2012. The lack of consent has been largely 
related to the fact that in October 2011, the 
Energy Community Ministerial Council 
adopted the EU’s Third Energy Package. Due 
to its shareholding in Moldovagaz, Gazprom 
still strongly opposes the Third Energy 
Package, in particular the so-called 
‘unbundling’ (of transmission networks). In 
the end, Moldova, pressed by Russia, has 
decided to postpone the implementation. 
There is no free transit through Russia. 
And due to its withdrawal in 2009, Russia is 
not a Contracting Party to the Energy Char-
ter Treaty. Ukraine and Moldova ratified the 
Energy Charter Treaty, but Belarus has not. 
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The agreement on the CIS free trade zone, 
which was signed in October 2011 by eight 
nations, has come into effect in four 
countries. The question of freedom of transit 
by pipelines is waiting for a solution. 
In the CEE region, the three main transit 
routes lead through Slovakia, Poland and 
Romania. Gas transit through Slovakia 
reached a peak of nearly 85 bcm in 1999. 
Yamal-Europe gas pipeline, commissioned 
in 1999, reduced the significance of 
Slovakia, while Poland became an important 
transit country to Germany. In 2011, 25 
bcm of gas entered Germany through this 
pipeline with a capacity of 32.9 bcma.58; 59 
Slovakia’s transit contract was signed in 
November 2008, covering a term of 20 
years and the transportation of 50 bcma of 
gas.60 In 2011, 47.4 bcm of gas was 
transited.61 The transit contract of RWE 
Transgas of the Czech Republic with Gazp-
rom was extended through 2035 to transit 
up to 30.5 bcma of gas.62 Moreover, the 
operation launch of the new transit pipeline 
with a capacity of 30-33 bcma through the 
Czech Republic called Gazelle is scheduled 
for January 2013. Gazelle is the 
continuation of Germany’s OPAL gas 
pipeline of 35 bcma of capacity. OPAL is 
connected to the Nord Stream pipeline. So as 
part of the wider Nord Stream project, 
Gazelle will transport the Russian gas 
delivered through the Nord Stream pipeline 
in the Baltic Sea even further. Romania’s 
Transgaz has two transit contracts with 
Gazprom (one is from 1987 and extended to 
2012, the other is from 1999 and valid until 
2023), but there is no information about the 
quantities.63 In 2006, Bulgaria’s transit 
contract was extended until 2030, 
                                                 
58 IEA (2005): 140; OilCapital.ru. 23 April 2012. 
http://www.oilcapital.ru/transport/155258.html. 
59 Implementing the Third Energy Package, in Po-
land, the owner of the Polish section of the Yamal-
Europe gas pipeline (EuRoPol GAZ) handed over 
operation and Poland’s state-owned natural gas 
transmission system operator (TSO) Gaz-System 
became the independent system operator (ISO) in 
2010. The unbundling is a serious source of conflict 
with Russia. It also concerns existing assets with 
Russian ownership (see below). 
60 Gazprom Export/Foreign partners/Slovakia. 
http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/partners/slovakia/ 
61 Medvedev (2012). 
62 Czech TSO Net4Gas (named at that time RWE 
Transgas Net) is still a subsidiary of RWE Transgas. 
63 ING (2008); Transgaz (2011). 
providing transit volumes of 17.8 bcma 
(with an option to an additional 5 bcma of 
gas).64 In 2011, Bulgaria transited 15 bcm, 
of which 80 per cent went to Turkey, 19 per 
cent to Greece, and one per cent to 
Macedonia.65 
Ukraine’s neighbours will or can find 
themselves in a new role as providers of 
transmission services to Ukraine. The 
Ukrainians approached Hungary to find out 
whether physical gas supply to Ukraine is 
possible. Currently, both technical and legal 
possibilities to pump gas to Ukraine from 
Hungary are in place.66 Naturally, the 
Ukrainian partner should buy gas 
somewhere. At the same time, Slovakia’s 
transmission system operator Eustream, a 
subsidiary of SPP, was considering 
construction of a new bi-directional 
interconnection between the gas 
transmission systems of Slovakia and 
Ukraine, but, as it was announced in 
October 2012, the Open Season had not 
identified sufficient binding market interest 
in the new transmission capacity.67; 68 
4.1. Bypass pipelines and their                       
effects on transit 
The first line of the Nord Stream gas 
pipeline, with a capacity of 27.5 bcma, 
became operational in November 2011, 
followed by the opening of the second line 
in October 2012. If it depends on Russia, 
                                                 
64 Gazprom Export/Foreign partners/Bulgaria. 
http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/partners/bulgaria/ 
65 Manager.bg. 30 September 2012. 
http://www.manager.bg/news/357-mln-evro-v-
ochakvane-na-nabuko%E2%80%9C-i-yuzhen-
potok%E2%80%9C. 
66 According to information provided this author by 
János Zsuga, CEO of Hungary’s TSO. 
67 Eustream – News (19 June 2012, 
http://www.eustream.sk/en_media/en_news/bindi
ng-open-season-for-the-sk-ua-gas-interconnector); 
Eustream – News (15 October 2012, 
http://www.eustream.sk/en_media/en_news/open-
season-for-the-sk-ua-interconnector-evaluated). 
68 Following completion of this study, finally, for the 
first time, gas deliveries to Ukraine from the west by 
reverse flow were managed. RWE started to supply 
physical gas flows to Ukraine from/“through” Po-
land, while Ukraine reduced its purchases from Rus-
sia below the take or pay minimum. 
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this will not be the last line in the Baltic Sea. 
Shareholders of the Nord Stream AG 
consortium, including Gazprom, 
Wintershall Holding (of Germany, 
belonging to the BASF Group), E.ON 
Ruhrgas, Gasunie (of the Netherlands) and 
GDF Suez (of France), considered a 
preliminary feasibility study for the third 
and fourth lines, and their construction was 
recognised as economically expedient and 
technically possible. Before the end of 
January 2013, a memorandum on the 
construction of new capacity is planned to 
be signed. One of the lines may go to Great 
Britain.69 
The capacity utilisation rate of the Nord 
Stream pipeline is expected to attain high 
levels, as Gazprom signed ship or pay 
contracts for 100 per cent of the capacity of 
55 bcma. However, since November 2011, 
the first line has only been moderately 
loaded, meaning that about a third of the 
available capacity has been used. After it 
reaches 100 per cent, the tariff per 
transmission of 1,000 cubic meters of gas to 
100 kilometres will be higher for sending 
gas through Ukraine than through the Nord 
Stream pipeline.70 Chyong, Noёl and Reiner 
(2010) came to the conclusion that the unit 
cost of shipping through Nord Stream is 
lower than using the Ukrainian route and is 
only slightly above shipping through the 
Yamal-Europe pipeline.71 The Nord Stream 
pipeline cost a total of EUR 7.4 billion. 
The South Stream pipeline through the 
Black Sea will provide a transport capacity 
of 63 bcma consisting of four strings; each 
of them is to have a capacity of 15.75 bcma. 
Gazprom, ENI, Wintershall Holding and EDF 
(of France) are the members of the South 
Stream Transport AG consortium that is 
responsible for studying, constructing and 
operating the offshore section of the 
pipeline. As to the November 2010 
announcement of Gazprom, the offshore 
part of the pipeline may cost EUR 10 billion, 
while the price tag of the onshore part in 
                                                 
69 RIA Novosti. 8 October 2012. http://ria.ru/econ-
omy /20121008/769142388.html, http://en.rian. 
ru/business/20121008/176482137.html. 
70 Kyiv Post. 6 September 2012. 
http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/nord-
stream-tariff-still-double-that-of-ukrainian-transit-
312571.html. 
71 Chyong–Noёl–Reiner (2010). 
Europe was put at EUR 5.5 billion.72 
According to Wintershall, the investments 
necessary for the offshore sections are 
estimated to be at least EUR 10 billion, while 
costs of EUR 20-25 billion have been 
estimated for the overall project (onshore 
and offshore).73 However, as for Russia, it 
does not end there. Both Nord Stream and 
South Stream spur a huge wave of pipeline 
construction in Russia.  
According to Putin’s recommendation, 
which was made at the end of December 
2011, the construction of South Stream will 
be launched at the end of 2012 (at least 
officially).74 South Stream is to be 
commissioned at the end of 2015 and 
commercial deliveries are set to start at the 
first quarter of 2016.75 Bulgaria will be the 
entry point of the pipelines from the Black 
Sea. Gas pipelines will run through the 
Turkish exclusive economic zone to Bulgaria. 
Gazprom had been waiting for a long time 
for Turkey to issue the permit for the South 
Stream construction. However, on the 
question of the land route of the pipeline, 
there were a number of uncertainties as well. 
The final investment decisions are scheduled 
to be made some time in October and Nov-
ember 2012.  
The earlier plans envisaged two 
branches, a northern and a southern one, 
starting from Bulgaria; however, the 
southern branch has been removed from the 
agenda. During its project presentation in 
Brussels in May 2011, Gazprom showed 
four options for the route of the South 
Stream gas pipeline. Romania was also 
included in one of the routes, but Romania 
did not join the South Stream project (as it 
did not sign an intergovernmental 
agreement), although a feasibility study was 
conducted for a possible Romanian section. 
A new turning point was reached when in 
May 2012 Gazprom’s corporate magazine 
stated that gas will go through Bulgaria, 
Serbia, Hungary and Slovenia to North-East 
Italy, and legs are planned to be built to the 
Bosnian Serb Republic and Croatia from 
                                                 
72 Korporativniy Zhurnal OAO “Gazprom”. No. 
11/2010: 9. 
73 Wintershall (n.d.). 
74 RIA Novosti. 30 December 2011. 
http://ria.ru/economy/20111230/529997206.html 
75 Korporativniy Zhurnal OAO “Gazprom”. No. 
5/2012. 
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Serbia and to Greece from Bulgaria. They 
did not exclude that other countries, 
including Macedonia and Montenegro, 
could join it too. But most importantly not a 
single word was written down about Austria 
and Southern Italy.76 The failure of buying 
shares in the Central European Gas Hub 
(CEGH) must have played a significant role in 
the exclusion of Austria. The preparations 
have not gone smoothly in the other 
countries of the northern branch either. 
There have been problems not only in 
Bulgaria (enjoying the best bargaining 
power), but also in Hungary. In August 2012, 
there was already news about that Croatia 
could replace Hungary. 
Europe faced gas supply interruptions 
through the western CIS transit states four 
times in the 2000’s, two of which happened 
in Belarus and two in Ukraine. While an 
interruption of gas supplies through Ukraine 
is felt by all CEE buyers except for the Baltic 
States, an interruption of the Belarusian 
transit is a serious problem “only” for 
Lithuania and Poland among the CEE 
countries. 
Nord Stream helps to change the balance 
of power between Russia and above all, 
Ukraine.77 The Nord Stream pipeline has 
been causing a reduction in the Ukrainian 
transit, which consequently reduces the 
transit through Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic. These transit countries also lose 
certain amounts of transit fees. However, 
transit through the Czech Republic will be 
doubly affected by the Nord Stream pipeline. 
This is because when completed, Gazelle 
will increase transit through the Czech 
Republic. In May 2011, half a year before 
the commissioning of Nord Stream, Miller 
said that 20 bcma of gas was planned to be 
redirected from transit to Europe via 
Ukraine to Nord Stream. It is just under one-
fifth of what Ukraine transported to Europe 
in 2010 and 2011.78 The aim of the 
redirection of transit activity can be seen 
from the November 2008 transit contract 
between Gazprom and Slovak TSO 
                                                 
76 Following completion of the study, it became cer-
tain that Austria, Greece and southern Italy had been 
removed from construction plans for the South 
Stream pipeline. 
77 Reuters. 7 November 2011. http://in.reuters.com/ 
article/2011/11/07/idINIndia-60372320111107. 
78 Reuters. 25 May 2011. http://ru.reuters.com/ 
article/idUKLDE74O27O20110525?sp=true. 
Eustream,79 and from data obtained from 
Eustream. According to gas industry analyst 
Mikhail Korchemkin, Gazprom is unlikely to 
fulfil its transit contract with Eustream.80 
However, Slovakia is secured by the ship or 
pay provision. At the same time, the 2009 
transit contract between Ukraine and Russia 
does not contain ship or pay obligations, so 
Gazprom can lower the transit volumes 
without facing a penalty. Belarus and 
consequently Poland are in a much safer 
position than Ukraine, as Gazprom has 
secured full ownership of the Belarusian gas 
pipelines. In fact, Gazprom would increase 
the transit through Belarus at the expense of 
Ukraine. 
South Stream is expected to have a 
significant impact on transit, adding very 
large available capacity. In May 2011, it 
was declared that two-thirds of the South 
Stream pipeline would be filled by gas under 
existing contracts, proving that it will be a 
bypass pipeline. But despite South Stream, 
Bulgaria’s Prime Minister explained in July 
2010 that Gazprom would continue to 
transit the same amount of natural gas 
through Bulgaria to Greece and Turkey 
using the existing pipelines.81 
In June 2011, Alexei Miller emphasised 
that when implementing the Nord Stream 
and the South Stream projects, they pursued 
the noble aim of completely excluding 
transit risks for Russian gas to Europe.82 In 
February 2012, in the heat of debate, Gazp-
rom stated that South Stream to full 
capacity, Nord Stream with additional lines 
and its existing capacity through Belarus 
and the Black Sea would reduce Ukraine’s 
importance for transit to zero.83 The 
pessimistic scenario of the updated draft 
Energy Strategy of Ukraine for the period 
                                                 
79 East European Gas Analysis. 15 February 2011. 
http://eegas.com/south-str-2011-02e-15.htm. 
80 East European Gas Analysis. 2 July 2012. 
http://www.eegas.com/slovakia-eustream.htm. 
81 Novinite.com. 10 July 2010. http://www.novinite. 
com/view_news.php?id=117974. 
82 Gazprom (2011a). 
83 Reuters (22 February 2012, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/22/russi
a-ukraine-gas-idUSL5E8DMAU920120222); 
Bloomberg (22 February 2012, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-
22/gazprom-sees-zero-need-for-ukraine-gas-
transit-with-new-links.html). 
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leading up to 2030 expects drastic declines 
in transit. 
The avoidance of the Third Energy 
Package is a regularly recurring issue in 
relation to the South Stream pipeline. 
However, this is not possible, irrespective of 
the dates and deadlines. It refers to either 
the unbundling or the capacity utilisation.84 
5) THE ROLE OF RUSSIAN GAS IN 
CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES 
The European Council of 4 February 2011 
concluded that no EU Member State should 
remain isolated from the European gas 
networks after 2015 or see its energy 
security jeopardised by lack of the 
appropriate connections. According to the 
EU regulation of October 2010, concerning 
measures to safeguard the security of gas 
supply, the transmission system operators 
shall enable permanent bi-directional 
capacity on all cross-border 
interconnections between Member States at 
the latest by December 2013, with some 
exceptions. The European Commission’s 
November 2010 communication on energy 
infrastructure priorities identified the 
following as priority projects in the CEE 
region: the North-South Corridor in Central 
Eastern and South-East Europe, the Southern 
Corridor and the Baltic Energy Market 
Interconnection Plan in gas (BEMIP Gas). 
Building gas interconnections has been a 
long-standing unresolved issue in Central 
and Eastern Europe, but recently some 
progress has been made.  
In order to break or at least ease Russia’s 
domination, greater or lesser attempts had 
been made in the Central and East European 
countries, but very few results were 
reported. The January 2009 gas crisis and 
the emergence of the “two price” or “hybrid 
price” market (a market with both the 
relatively very expensive – Russian – 
contract gas prices and the hub-based mar-
                                                 
84 The latest reaction to the unbundling requirements 
is Gazprom’s intention to restructure its European 
assets. Interfax. 19 September 2012.  
http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?id=361880. 
ket prices) gave new impetus. The existence 
of segmented markets has always been a 
great advantage for Gazprom (the possibility 
to execute price discrimination). But while 
some are happy to point out that Gazprom 
had been trying to prevent the 
diversification or the free flow of gas, the 
lack of diversification could have been 
explained many times by simple economic 
reasons, such as the price of Russian gas, 
compared to other options. And we have not 
talked about the discounted prices for the 
Baltic States that ended in 2008, thus 
ensuring equal profitability for Gazprom, 
compared to the European markets. Also the 
method of ‘gas for transit’ had to be 
abolished in the Central and East European 
transit states.  
In some countries, a minimum level of 
diversification is required by legislation. In 
Poland,  the maximum share of imported 
gas from one country of origin relative to 
the total volume of imported gas was set for 
each year in 2000 until 2020. The 
Regulation applies to all wholesalers buying 
gas from abroad. In Lithuania, the LNG 
terminal project brings minimum limits to 
diversification. The legislation requires at 
least 25 per cent of the country’s natural gas 
needs to be purchased via the terminal.85 In 
Bulgaria, the government’s main objective is 
that a supplier should not have a market 
share greater than 50 per cent by 2020 (or 
earlier).86 
Various types of intermediaries were and 
have been involved in gas import and trade 
ever since. The Eural Trans Gas, which was 
registered and being operated in Hungary as 
an offshore business entity and the Swiss-
based Rosukrenergo comprise just one group 
of (former) intermediaries. Also, there are 
some joint ventures, such as Panrusgáz in 
Hungary, Yugorosgaz in Serbia or Overgaz in 
Bulgaria, which are registered in the 
concerned country. In Bulgaria and Romania, 
an intermediary such as the Swiss-based 
WIEE also plays a role.87 To secure the 
                                                 
85 15min.lt. 12 June 2012. http://www.15min.lt/en 
/article/business/lithuanian-parliament-approves-
lng-terminal-construction-527-225787. 
86 Minisztersztvo na ikonomikata, energetikata i 
turizma na Reszpublika Balgarija (2011); 24chasa.bg 
(24 November 2011, http://www.24chasa.bg/Arti-
cle.asp?ArticleId=1125602). 
87 Wintershall Erdgas Handelshaus Zug AG (WIEE) is 
a subsidiary of the Berlin-based Wintershall Erdgas 
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removal of certain intermediaries is not a 
new issue. 
Statistics of gas imports to each country are 
very different; therefore, without a proper 
explanation, they can be misleading. For 
example, BP indicates in its statistics that 
flows are on a contractual basis and may not 
correspond to physical gas flows in all cases. 
And it is important to understand that the 
physical flow of gas can differ from the 
commercial flow of gas. In such cases, they 
are administered as if the gas volumes 
purchased actually came to a particular point. 
For example, gas is not physically delivered to 
Hungary from Germany and France from the 
direction of Austria (Baumgarten an der 
March) by long-term gas supply contracts 
with E.ON Ruhrgas and GDF Suez, 
respectively. Moreover, the region is flooded 
with gas from Russia causing the real part of 
Russian gas to be higher than the numbers 
indicate. 
5.1. The Baltic States  
Among the Central and East European 
countries, only Estonia and Latvia can be 
supplied from Russia without transit 
countries. The third Baltic country, 
Lithuania is dependent on transit through 
Belarus, but it also provides transit to 
Russia’s exclave Kaliningrad Oblast. Latvia’s 
underground gas storage facility plays a 
significant role in this region, as during the 
winter, gas is supplied from the gas storage 
not only to Latvia’s consumers, but also to 
Estonia, Lithuania and back to Russia. The 
expansion of the gas interconnection 
between Latvia and Lithuania is in 
progress.88 
                                                                          
Handelshaus GmbH & Co. KG (WIEH), which is, in 
turn, a joint venture of Gazprom and Wintershall. 
WIEE is also present in Hungary through its subsidi-
ary WIEE Hungary. 
88 Gazprom has stakes in all three “national” gas 
companies (in Estonia’s Eesti Gaas, Latvia’s Latvijas 
Gāze and Lithuania’s Lietuvos Dujos) of the three 
Baltic Sates, respectively, so unbundling concerns 
these assets. Among the three Baltic States, Lithuania 
came first and decided to nationalise its transmission 
system. In June 2011, Lithuania’s parliament voted in 
favour of full ownership unbundling, approving a 
bill to separate the country’s gas transportation and 
The three Baltic States do not have any 
interconnections with Central Europe. They 
only buy gas from Russia. As to Estonia, Eesti 
Gaas is the only one that imports gas; its 
contract with Gazprom is valid until 2015. 
Previously, the fertiliser producer Nitrofert 
purchased gas directly from Gazprom, but in 
February 2009 it suspended its activities due 
to high gas prices; therefore, Estonia’s gas 
imports were drastically reduced. Eesti Gaas 
also purchases gas from Latvia’s Itera Latvija, 
but in small quantities. According to a 2009 
presentation regarding its gas sales chain in 
2008 by the parent company Itera, Russia’s 
independent gas producer, gas belonging to 
Itera comes to Itera Latvija through Gazprom 
Export, and then, in turn, from Itera Latvija to 
Eesti Gaas and Latvia’s Latvijas Gāze. Itera has 
a long-term contract to supply 0.6 bcma of 
gas to Latvia by 2030, while supplies to 
Estonia are only 0.1 bcma.89 In Latvia, all 
import operations are handled by Latvijas 
Gāze on the basis of a long-term supply 
contract among Latvijas Gāze, Gazprom and 
Itera Latvija.90 In February 2009, Latvijas 
Gāze and Gazprom extended their gas supply 
contract until 2030, which would have been 
due to expire in 2015. 
Gazprom exports gas to five companies 
in Lithuania, namely to the vertically 
integrated gas company Lietuvos Dujos, the 
nitrogen fertiliser producer Achema, the gas 
trading company Dujotekana (being the 
second main gas supplier to both the 
wholesale and retail markets), the Kaunas 
power plant (‘Kauno termofikacijos 
elektrinė’) and Haupas; the latter supplies 
gas to the Druskininkai region. Since 
October 2008, Gazprom has been supplying 
gas through the intermediary LT Gas Stream 
AG to Dujotekana, whose contract is 
                                                                          
supply assets. In October 2011, the government set 
an October 2014 deadline for the unbundling. Since 
announcing the ownership unbundling in the spring 
of 2010, the dispute between Lithuania and Russia 
has been very intense, with the involvement of na-
tional courts, arbitral tribunals and the European 
Commission. In early June 2012, Estonia’s parlia-
ment also passed a law on unbundling. Accordingly, 
Eesti Gaas must sell its natural gas transportation 
network before the end of 2014, and the government 
is required to approve the sale. In April 2012, Latvia 
announced its intention to unbundle gas monopoly 
Latvijas Gāze as well. The deadline is no later than 
2017. 
89 Henderson (2010): 70. 
90 Latvia Public Utilities Commission (2011). 
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effective until the end of 2012. The contract 
of Haupas lasts until 2013,91 while those of 
Lietuvos Dujos and Achema until 2015,92 
and, according to Lithuania’s Energy 
Ministry, that of Kauno termofikacijos 
elektrinė until 2017.93 It can be seen that 
there are several gas supply contracts, and, 
in turn, it can be supposed that for them the 
prices are not the same. It is confirmed that 
Achema buys gas for less than Lietuvos 
Dujos.94 
The Baltic States have been unable to 
agree on a regional LNG regasification 
terminal; therefore, they turned to the Euro-
pean Commission to choose the proper 
location. Lithuania, however, insisting on its 
own facility, signed a lease agreement for a 
floating liquefied natural gas storage and 
regasification unit (FSRU) in early March 
2012. In mid-June 2012, the Lithuanian 
parliament adopted a law concerning the 
LNG terminal.95 The conclusions of supply 
contracts are yet to be reached. 
While the date for the start of operation 
of the LNG terminal is the end of 2014, the 
interconnection between Poland and 
Lithuania (GIPL) is only expected to be 
commissioned in the late 2010’s. The 
feasibility study is due to be completed in 
the first quarter of 2013. The 
Balticconnector between Finland and 
Estonia is still in its planning phase, and, in 
principle (!), a final decision is supposed to 
be made about it sometime in 2013–2014. 
5.2. Poland  
                                                 
91 NCC (2012). 
92 The Lithuania Tribune (25 February 2012, 
http://www.lithuaniatribune.com/2012/02/25/ac
hemas-leader-says-pms-letter-was-not-the-reason-
for-cheaper-gas-supply/); The Lithuania Tribune 
(22 October 2012,  
http://www.lithuaniatribune.com/2012/10/22/ga
zprom-has-strong-commercial-reasons-to-maintain-
its-current-pricing-in-europe-russian-expert/). 
93 Lietuvos Respublikos energetikos ministerija 
(2012). According to this report, Haupas’ contract 
ends in 2015. 
94 15min.lt. 4 July 2012. 
http://www.15min.lt/en/article/politics/ethics-
commission-clears-lithuanian-prime-minister-of-
conflict-of-interest-suspicions-526-231422. 
95 15min.lt. 12 June 2012. http://www.15min.lt/en 
/article/business/lithuanian-parliament-approves-
lng-terminal-construction-527-225787. 
Poland has the opportunity to buy gas from 
the east, west and south, but capacities are 
very limited at the southern and western 
borders. Some of the cross-border pipelines 
are only for the local needs (and gas is not 
introduced to the transmission grid). Poland 
can physically receive gas through the 
following channels:   
(1) From the east through Belarus (through 
two entry points from the network of 
Beltransgaz and one cross-border entry 
point through the Yamal-Europe gas 
pipeline) and from/through Ukraine 
(through two entry points); 
(2) from the west from/through Germany 
(through three entry points); and 
(3) from the south from/through the Czech 
Republic (through three entry points).96 
Recently, Poland’s import possibilities 
from the non-east directions have been 
increased by 3.3 bcma, representing about 
30 per cent of current imports. Firstly, since 
November 2011, a virtual reverse flow ser-
vice on the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline has 
been offered (with a volume up to 
approximately 2.3 bcma). Secondly, since 
January 2012, import capacity from the 
direction of Germany through Lasów has 
been increased by about 0.5 bcma to 1.5 
bcma.97 Thirdly, in September 2011, a new 
cross-border gas pipeline between Poland 
and the Czech Republic called STORK (with 
the Cieszyn entry point) was opened, with a 
capacity of 0.5 bcma in the first phase. (The 
deadline for the STORK II project is 2017.)98  
In 2011, 9.3 bcm of gas, or 85 per cent 
of the total imports to Poland, were 
purchased under the long-term contract 
with Russia, while 1.6 bcm arrived (mostly) 
from Germany and (in small volumes) from 
the Czech Republic. These were 
supplemented by the domestic production of 
4.3 bcm of gas.99 While other countries 
worried about the excess gas volumes 
contracted, Poland was trying to adjust its 
                                                 
96 PGNiG (2012); Minister of Economy (2011); 
Gazoprojekt (2010). 
97 Total import capacity available from Germany, 
including the capacity for the local needs, is just 
minimally more than the above-mentioned capacity. 
98 Gaz-System – News. 10 January 2012. 
http://en.gaz-system.pl/press-centre/news/infor-
mation-for-the-media/artykul/201338.html. 
99 URE (2012). Compare with data given by, for 
example, the IEA (6.2 bcm in 2011). 
19 
negative gas balance in 2009–2010, caused 
by the elimination of the intermediary 
Rosukrenergo in early 2009. After a short-
term contract in 2009, it was only in 
October 2010 that an annex to the existing 
long-term contract was signed, allowing an 
increase of gas purchases. With this step, 
Gazprom’s role in Poland’s gas supplies has 
definitely increased. However, the contract 
was finally not renewed until 2037, so the 
expiration date remained 2022, which was 
a wise move, as it is necessary to evaluate 
the shale gas potential and other options. 
Due to the high oil-indexed contract prices 
of Russia’s gas, PGNiG planned in March 
2012 to minimise purchases in 2012 to the 
take or pay level (85%) and supply the rest 
through the interconnections with Germany 
and the Czech Republic as well as the virtual 
reverse on the Yamal-Europe gas 
pipeline.100 
The 1990’s saw a stream of 
diversification announcements about 
bringing pipeline gas from Netherlands, 
Norway and Denmark. But despite 
negotiations and even contracts, only a 
“small contract” was concluded with 
Norway on the supply of only 0.5 bcma of 
gas for the period between 2000 and 
2006.101 Poland has already been supplied 
from Germany and the Czech Republic from 
the 1990’s onwards, taking only a very 
small amount of gas for the local needs. 
Before 2009, a certain type of diversification 
was achieved from the east, first by Eural 
Trans Gas and then Rosukrenergo. Also, 
Ukraine’s Naftohaz was selling a very small 
quantity of gas for the local needs under a 
long-term gas supply contract, signed in 
2004 for the period until 2020, but Ukraine 
suspended deliveries. Once completed, the 
LNG regasification terminal will open up a 
new dimension for Poland in 2014. So far, 
only one deal has been made, with Qatar for 
the supply of 1 mmtpa of LNG for 20 years. 
As for the missing gas link with its 
neighbour Slovakia, in January 2011, a 
                                                 
100 Reuters (20 March 2012, http://www.reuters. 
com/article/2012/03/20/pgnig-gazprom-
idUSL6E8EK2PY20120320); Bloomberg (20 March 
2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-
20/pgnig-plans-to-cut-gazprom-gas-purchases-to-
85-of-upper-limit.html). 
101 Stern (2005): 116; Statoil.ru 
(http://www.statoil.ru/statoilcom/inf/svg01429.nsf
/html/e1999_1999gas). 
letter of intent for cooperation on the 
development of the interconnection between 
Poland and Slovakia was signed. The 
feasibility study will be completed in early 
2013. In principle, the deadline for the 
completion of the pipeline is 2017. The 
interconnection between Denmark and 
Poland, called Baltic Pipe, which could 
connect the Norwegian–Swedish–Danish 
Skanled gas pipeline project (the latter was 
suspended in 2009), is now scheduled to be 
commissioned in 2020 (depending on the 
market interest).102 
5.3. Slovakia  
Under normal circumstances, gas physically 
enters Slovakia from Ukraine and gas transit 
leaves Slovakia towards the Czech Republic 
(Lanžhot) and Austria (Baumgarten).103 
During the January 2009 gas crisis, for the 
first time gas entered Slovakia from the west 
to the east, i.e. the physical flow of gas was 
directed through the Lanžhot border 
transfer station, however, only in small 
amounts.104 The Slovak transmission 
network is now able to transport gas from 
the west to the east in standard operating 
mode.105 There is another Austrian–Slovak 
gas pipeline, the Kittsee-Petržalka gas 
pipeline (KIP), which was commissioned in 
2009 and can be used for emergency needs. 
After the gas crisis broke out, the pipeline 
was swiftly completed; only a few metres of 
pipelines were missing on the Slovakian 
                                                 
102 Source: “List of projects submitted to be consid-
ered as potential Projects of Common Interest in 
energy infrastructure – Gas.” 
103 Slovakia’s Mokrý Háj is an entry point into the 
inland transmission system of the Czech Republic 
(and not into the transit system). Mokrý Háj connects 
the Czech system with the Láb underground gas 
storage facility in Slovakia. However, there is a 
further cross-border pipeline between Slovakia and 
the Czech Republic. A storage facility in the Czech 
Republic at Dolní Bojanovice is directly connected to 
the Slovak system (IEA, 2012a; ERU, n.d.). 
104 SPP (2009); ERU (2010); European Commission 
(2009). 
105 Eustream – News. 30 November 2011. 
http://www.eustream.sk/en_media/en_press-
releases/reverse-flow-project-is-completed. 
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side.106 From among its neighbours, Slovakia 
is not interconnected with Poland and Hun-
gary. As opposed to the non-binding phase 
in 2009, the binding phase of the Open 
Season process107 for the development of the 
interconnection between Slovakia and Hun-
gary yielded unsuccessful results twice in 
2010. Subsequently, Hungary’s TSO FGSZ, 
owned by Mol and operating as an ITO 
(independent transmission operator), was 
replaced by Hungary’s state-owned 
electricity company MVM Group in the pro-
ject. The project company is now owned 
equally by MVM and MFB Invest; the latter 
is a subsidiary of Hungary’s state-owned 
MFB Hungarian Development Bank. The 
pipeline would start to operate in January 
2015. 
Before 2004, Gazprom was the sole 
external gas supplier to Slovakia. Alternative 
supplies from Norway or the Netherlands 
were considered in the second half of the 
1990’s, but they did not materialise.108 In 
the end, only Eural Trans Gas and then 
Rosukrenergo remained as options. SPP and 
Gazprom Export signed a new long-term gas 
supply contract only in November 2008, 
starting in January 2009. SPP is supplied with 
6.5 bcma of gas over a 20-year period. The 
contract signing was shortly followed by the 
January 2009 gas crisis, which finally gave 
impetus to start diversifying. After the 
January 2009 gas crisis, SPP signed 
(diversification) contracts with E.ON Ruhrgas 
for 10 years, and GDF Suez for 5 years,109 
which can cover up to 20 per cent of 
Slovakia’s annual gas consumption. In case of 
a disruption of supplies from the east, these 
volumes can be obtained following the flow 
reversal of the gas pipeline system.110 Hun-
gary (more precisely Mol) had already signed 
contracts in the 1990’s with (E.ON) Ruhrgas 
                                                 
106 Gas Connect Austria GmbH 
(http://www.gasconnect.at/de/Unser-Netz/Lei-
tungssystem/KIP); ICIS Heren (28 January 2009, 
http://www.icis.com/heren/articles/2009/01/28/
9309362/russiaukraine-crisis-wake-up-call-for-
europe.html); Rokovania vlády Slovenskej republiky 
(n.d.). 
107 Open Season process allows shippers to express 
their interests and book capacity. 
108 IEA (2005): 138. 
109 In addition to these, SPP signed a short-term con-
tract with Germany’s VNG for 30 mmcm of gas in an 
emergency case. Gazprom holds a 10.52 per cent 
stake in VNG. 
110 IEA (2011c). 
and GDF (Suez), still the owners of SPP with a 
total share of 49 per cent. 
5.4. The Czech Republic 
Gas can enter the Czech Republic not only 
from Slovakia, but also from Germany. There 
are four cross-border entry points from 
Germany. The Czech Republic, having only 
a marginal domestic gas production, made a 
step to break the dominant position of the 
Russian gas supplies in 1997, when the then 
state-owned Transgas of the Czech Republic 
signed a long-term gas supply contract with 
Norwegian companies for 20 years. The 
contract envisaged annual supplies 
gradually increasing to 3 bcm by 2002.111 
Transgas signed a long-term gas supply 
contract with Gazexport112 in 1998 for 15 
years, but the contract was extended in 
2006 until 2035. The contract is for 9 bcma 
of gas. Until 2005, RWE Transgas was the 
sole importer of gas to the Czech Republic. 
In 2006, new gas importers, namely 
Vemex113 and Wingas (a joint venture of 
Wintershall and Gazprom), started to 
operate on the Czech market. They were 
supplied by Gazprom Export, but their 
combined market share was negligible, 
approximately 0.5 per cent. In 2007, apart 
from RWE Transgas, Vemex was said to be 
the only importer of gas. Through Vemex, 
Gazprom diversified its exports to the Czech 
Republic and reached the final consumers, 
thereby circumventing RWE Transgas. A 
March 2006 short-term supply contract 
between Vemex and Gazprom Export was 
followed by a long(er)-term one in October 
2007.114 The contract for 2008 to 2012 was 
                                                 
111 Europolitics (23 April 1997, 
http://www.europolitics.info/czechs-and-norway-
sign-natural-gas-supply-deal-artr196930-10.html); 
EU Enlargement Watch (2000). 
112 This was the old name of Gazprom Export. 
113 At that time, ZMB GmbH of Germany and Cen-
trex Europe Energy & Gas AG of Austria each held 33 
per cent in Vemex. In 2009, trading subsidiary ZMB 
merged into its parent company Gazprom Germania. 
The sole shareholder of Gazprom Germania is Gaz-
prom Export. Now, Gazprom Germania has a 50.14 
per cent stake in Vemex. 
114 redOrbit. 12 October 2007. 
http://www.redorbit.com/news/business/1100068
/gazprom_and_vemex_reportedly_sign_gas_deal/. 
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conducted to deliver only 0.5 bcma of gas, 
with a possible extension for five years 
following that. In 2010, the number of 
importers was increased to 19 (from 12 in 
2009 and 5 in 2008). The most important 
ones were RWE Transgas and Vemex. But 
the market share of RWE Transgas has been 
quickly falling in the Czech Republic.115 The 
difference between the long-term contract 
prices and market prices has hit the 
company. Many new traders have bought 
gas in West European markets for the Czech 
Republic at advantageous prices. In 2009, 
the share of the Russian imports fell 
dramatically to 58.8 per cent from 73.6 per 
cent in 2008. In 2010, Russia accounted for 
64.1 per cent of gas imports, while 
Norwegian gas for 12.4 per cent and gas 
from EU Member States for 23.5 per cent. In 
2009, gas supplied by German companies 
represented 6.6 per cent of the total imports, 
compared to 2.5 per cent in 2008. In 2007, 
only 2 mmcm of gas came from Germany 
for Vemex from a VNG storage facility. The 
share of supplies from the EU and Russia 
was increased at the expense of those from 
Norway.116 Concerning the interconnections 
with neighbouring countries, there are no 
interconnections between Austria and the 
Czech Republic,117 although four pipelines 
have been planned.  
5.5. Hungary 
Hungary buys gas through cross-border 
pipelines with Ukraine and Austria. Due to 
the high Russian contract prices, imported 
quantities through the Ukrainian–Hungarian 
border (at Beregovo point for domestic use) 
have fallen dramatically since 2008, while 
the role of the HAG pipeline between Austria 
and Hungary became very significant. 
                                                 
115 RWE Transgas (2012). 
116 Information is provided by the annual reports of 
the Energy Regulatory Office of the Czech Republic. 
See http://www.energy-regulators.eu/portal/page 
/portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS; 
http://eru.cz/dias-browse_articles.php?parentId 
=271 
117 The border crossing between Hevlín (the Czech 
Republic) and Laa an der Thaya (Austria) is a differ-
ent thing. It is a connection between the distribution 
networks. 
Thanks to the increased interest, the capacity 
of HAG has been expanded. But before this 
has been done, the import capacity at the 
Ukrainian–Hungarian border was expanded, 
which was partly necessary because of the 
new strategic gas storage facility in Hungary. 
The Hungarian–Romanian interconnection 
was inaugurated in 2010, while the 
Hungarian–Croatian one in 2011.118 Apart 
from the missing interconnection between 
Hungary and Slovakia, a small-capacity 
pipeline between Hungary and Slovenia was 
proposed by Slovenia, but its interest did not 
go beyond a completed feasibility study.  
The main gas supplier to Hungary is 
Gazprom Export through the intermediary 
Panrusgáz. E.ON Földgáz Trade’s long-term 
gas supply contract expires in 2015.119; 120 
This contract was concluded by Mol and 
subsequently was taken over by E.ON 
Ruhrgas, as it acquired, among others, Mol’s 
gas wholesale, marketing and trading 
subsidiary Mol Földgázellátó (Mol Natural 
Gas Supply Co.) in the middle of the 2000’s. 
As mentioned, in (the second half of) the 
1990’s, Mol signed supply contracts with 
Ruhrgas (until 2015) and Gaz de France 
(until 2012) as well.121 In 1998, long-term 
gas supply contracts were also signed with 
O&G Minerals Ltd. and (the latter’s 
subsidiary) the Hungarian-based “Euro-
bridge” Kft. for delivery of gas from 
Ukrainian sources. However, in early 
January 2005, Mol abrogated the latter two 
due to breaches of contract. The Swiss-based 
Bothli Trade AG came to replace them with 
a 2004 contract with Mol. Bothli was selling 
gas that belonged to Eural Trans Gas to 
Mol.122 As Eural was an offshore company, 
                                                 
118 According to CEO FGSZ János Zsuga, physical 
reverse flow is possible on all cross-border intercon-
nections with the EU Member States. 
119 Panrusgáz has a gas purchase contract with Gaz-
prom Export and, in turn, a gas sales contract with 
E.ON Földgáz Trade. The future role of MVM and the 
planned takeover of E.ON’s gas business in Hungary 
will not be discussed here.  
120 In July 2007, Gazprom Export and the Hungar-
ian-based Centrex Hungária signed a long-term gas 
supply contract for the period of 1 October 2008 to 
31 December 2028. 
121 I approached E.ON Földgáz Trade with questions 
about its long-term gas supply contracts, but no data 
was given. 
122 FigyelőNet (8 April 2004, 
http://fn.hir24.hu/itthon/2004/04/08/gazmosas_s
vajcon_at_kapna/?action=PrintPage); Mol (1997–
2004a) (Mol  2004b). 
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registered in Hungary, its activity was 
restricted. But with the coming of the 
Hungarian-based company Emfesz, Bothli-
Trade assigned its two gas supply contracts 
with Mol to Emfesz,123 and Eural was 
replaced by Rosukrenergo. After the January 
2009 gas crisis, when Rosukrenergo was 
eliminated from the system, the fate of 
Emfesz was sealed. 
5.6. Serbia 
Serbia receives gas from and through Hun-
gary and provides transit services to Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Serbia has no other cross-
border entry and exit points. The share of 
domestic gas production in consumption has 
increased in Serbia, accounting for 19 per 
cent in 2011. With the exception of a small 
amount of gas that is imported from Hunga-
ry, Russia is the dominant gas supplier to 
Serbia.124 The latter is based on the long-
term contract with Gazprom, but annexes 
are added to the contract every year. So the 
practice of extending the Russian–Serbian 
supply contract is an annual event.125 
According to earlier statements, the take or 
pay principle has not yet been applied to 
Serbia. In mid-October 2012, an 
intergovernmental agreement between 
Serbia and Russia on Russian gas supplies 
until 2021, needed for the new long-term 
(commercial) gas supply contract, was 
signed. The agreement envisions gas 
supplies of up to 5 bcma, which is more 
than double of the current level of imports, 
and only for domestic use. According to 
media information, Gazprom and Srbijagas 
will be signing contracts regulating the 
                                                 
123 Case No COMP/M.3696 E.ON/MOL. 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/dec
isions/m3696_20051221_20600_en.pdf. 
124 Concerning purchases from Hungary, all the in-
formation we have is that in October 2009 Srbijagas 
and E.ON Földgáz Trade signed a gas sale contract for 
200 mmcm of gas in the winter of 2009/2010. E.ON 
Földgáz Trade – News. 29 October 2009. 
http://www.eon-foldgaz-trade.com/en/media 
/press/news/e-on-seals-gas-supply-agreement-
with-srbijagas. 
125 AERS (2011); AERS (2012); Gazprom Export – 
Gas market news (30 December 2010, http://www. 
gazpromexport.com/en/presscenter/news/98/). 
price and delivery volumes every year 
throughout the timeframe of the new 
agreement.126 In mid-December 2011, 
Srbijagas’ general manager was speaking 
about a discounted price, adding that Serbia 
would be required to draw 85 per cent of 
the agreed quantity, but would not have to 
pay penalties for not taking up the 
remainder. It was also added that a 
possibility for Serbia to renegotiate its 
commercial terms each year would be 
included.127 
On the question of gas interconnection 
projects in Serbia, the planned bi-directional 
Serbian–Bulgarian interconnector would be 
operational by the end of 2015, and 
theoretically the construction would start in 
2013. The project is part of the Energy 
Community Gas Ring (formerly known as the 
Western Balkan Ring), which is a concept of 
linking the networks of Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Serbia with each other to 
develop a regional gas market. The Ionian 
Adriatic Pipeline (IAP), which is planned to 
run along the Adriatic coast from Albania 
through Montenegro to Croatia,128 would be 
a part of the Gas Ring. The bi-directional IAP 
could connect Croatia with the planned 
Trans Adriatic Pipeline (or TAP, the Greece–
Albania–Italy pipeline, see below) in Albania. 
For the Gas Ring, interconnections of 
Croatia–Serbia, Serbia–Kosovo–Macedonia, 
Macedonia–Albania and Croatia–Bosnia-
Herzegovina should also be built.129  
5.7. Bosnia-Herzegovina 
                                                 
126 RIA Novosti (13 October 2012, 
http://en.rian.ru/world/20121013/176601838.ht
ml); Itar-Tass (13 October 2012, http://pda.itar-
tass.com/c1/544850.html); Interfax (15 October 
2012, http://interfax.az/view/555093); Gazprom 
Export – Gas market news (13 October 2012, 
http://www.gazpromexport.com/en/presscenter/ne
ws/701/). 
127 Reuters. 21 December 2011. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/21/serbi
a-gazprom-gas-idUSL6E7NL4H320111221. 
128 It was aimed at examining the possible route 
through Bosnia-Herzegovina as well. 
129 Note that there are no interconnections not only 
between Serbia and Bulgaria, but between Serbia and 
Romania either. These can be considered as feed-in 
lines to the Gas Ring. 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina can only receive gas 
imports through the border with Serbia, and 
is entirely dependent on gas purchases from 
Russia. Energoinvest d.d. Sarajevo and 
Gazprom extend the gas supply contract 
annually. At the end of 2011, when the 
contract was extended for 2012, the news 
was about negotiations on a long-term gas 
supply contract continuing.130 In Bosnia-
Herzegovina, due to the poor conditions in 
the industry, the gas consumption is lower 
than in 1990. Although the current gas 
consumption is well below the pre-war 
levels, significant increases are expected by 
2020.131 As to the gas transmission pipeline 
development projects, apart from the leg of 
the Ionian Adriatic Pipeline, the possibility 
of other interconnections between Croatia 
and Bosnia is also being examined.132 A total 
of three interconnections between Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Croatia would be built. 
However, their implementation is yet to 
happen.133 
5.8. Croatia 
Croatia has substantial gas production, 
compared to its consumption. The gas 
supply contract with Gazprom Export ended 
at the end of 2010. Until the end of 2010, 
Croatia imported around 1 bcma of gas 
from Gazprom Export, and received a 
negligible volume of gas, i.e. only a few 
million cubic meters a year, from others.134 
Finally, at the end of 2010, Prirodni Plin, a 
                                                 
130 24sata.info. 1 December 2011. 
http://www.24sata.info/vijesti/bosna-i-
hercegovina/79468-Moskva-Energoinvest-
Gazprom-dogovorili-produzenje-isporuke-gasa-
BiH.html 
131 Softić–Glamočić (2012). 
132 Western Balkans Investment Framework 
(http://www.wbif-ipf.eu/index.php?page_id= 
377&id=88, http://www.wbif-ipf.eu/index.php? 
page_id=377&id=89); Đurović (2012); Frančić 
(2011); BH-Gas (2010). 
133 Business.hr. 12 July 2012. 
http://www.business.hr/ulaganja/antunovic-rok-
za-lng-na-krku-kraj-2016-godine/print 
134 For example, in 2009, at least on paper, a very 
minimal amount of gas was imported from Italy, 
Slovenia, Germany, France and Switzerland (HERA, 
2010). 
subsidiary of Croatia’s INA, signed a 
contract with ENI to get only 750 mmcm of 
gas per year for three years. This was 
followed in June 2011 by the gas supply 
deal between Croatia’s Prvo Plinarsko 
Društvo and E.ON Ruhrgas, but the volume 
and the term were not made public.135 It 
was a very significant event in terms of 
diversification when gas supplies through 
the Hungarian–Croatian interconnection 
started in 2011. Croatia had been able to 
import gas only through Slovenia for a long 
time. But since a leg is planned to be built to 
Croatia from the South Stream project (see 
below), it is clear that in the future they will 
again buy gas from Russia. As for the other 
projects, according to late 2011 
information, the Croatian–Italian 
interconnector was commissioned and is 
operating as an upstream pipeline.136 Apart 
from the Croatian–Serbian and Croatian–
Bosnian interconnections, interconnections 
between Croatia and Slovenia are also 
included in the plans. Moreover, if the 
original plans had gone ahead, Croatia’s 
LNG regasification facility would have been 
operating. But in Croatia, the Adria LNG 
project of an international consortium, 
planned on the island of Krk, has stalled. 
Meanwhile, Croatia is not waiting. The 
Croatian state-owned TSO Plinacro is 
examining a three-phase alternative project, 
the so-called ‘migration concept,’ starting 
with an LNG Regasification Vessel (LNG RV) 
and reaching the third phase with an 
onshore LNG terminal. However, some 
phases could be skipped. The results of the 
feasibility study will have been known by 
September 2013, with a final investment 
decision expected before the end of 2013.137 
                                                 
135 In July 2012, Croatia’s largest fertiliser producer, 
Petrokemija d.d. signed a gas supply contract with 
E.ON Ruhrgas only for the August–September 2012 
period. 
136 Zsuga (2011): 7. 
137 Presentation given by Dubravko Proštenik (Plina-
cro) in Budapest on 31 May 2012 (“Annual Stake-
holder Seminar of the Priority Area 2 – to encourage 
more sustainable energy – of the EU Strategy for the 
Danube Region”); Ministarstvo regionalnoga razvoja 
i fondova Europske unije; ICIS Heren (4 July 2012, 
http://www.icis.com/heren/articles/2012/07/04/
9575385/first-phase-of-croatian-lng-terminal-
ready-for-2016.html); Plinacro – Novosti  
(http://www.plinacro.hr/default.aspx?id=371); 
Western Balkan Investment Framework  
http://www.mrrfeu.hr/UserDocsImages/EU%20fon
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5.9. Slovenia 
Slovenia is almost entirely dependent on 
external supplies of gas, with a volume of 
more than 1 bcma. Slovenia receives gas 
from the direction of both Italy and Austria. 
Since 2003, the share of Russian imports 
had been steadily declining from 59 per 
cent in 2003 to only 47 per cent in 2010. In 
2011, 48 per cent was supplied from Russia, 
23 per cent from Algeria, 22 per cent from 
Austria, 7 per cent from Italy and the rest 
from other countries. Geoplin d.o.o. Ljublja-
na is the largest importer of gas, with a 92.8 
per cent share of the market in 2011. In 
2011, Adriaplin, belonging to ENI, and 
Petrol were the other two importers.138 In 
2009 and 2010, the role of short-term 
contracts in gas imports saw a dramatic 
increase, followed by a slight decrease in 
2011. Geoplin’s long-term gas supply 
contract with Gazprom is effective through 
to 2017. In 2009, the Slovenian side 
proposed that the contract be revised and 
extended until 2035. In August 2009, Gazp-
rom Export and Geoplin signed a letter of 
intent to extend the contract and review the 
possibility of increasing the amount of gas in 
the framework of the South Stream pro-
ject.139 In March 2011, the head of Gazp-
rom said that they were negotiating to 
extend the contract until 2035, and increase 
the export from 0.5 to 1.7 bcma.140 Since 
then, no contract has been signed. 
5.10. Romania 
With the commissioning of the Hungarian–
Romanian interconnection, Romania 
                                                                          
dovi/b03%20WB5-HR-ENE-01-LNG_Regasification 
_Vessel%2020%2002%202012.pdf 
138 Information is derived from the annual reports of 
Slovenia’s Energy Agency (as an energy regulator). 
See http://www.agen-rs.si/en/informacija.asp?id 
_meta_type=36&id_informacija=708, 
http://www.energy-regulators.eu/portal/page/ 
portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS 
139 RIA Novosti. 16 February 2011. http://www.ria. 
ru/economy/20110216/334797983.html 
140 RIA Novosti. 22 March 2011. 
http://ria.ru/economy/20110322/356819989.html 
receives gas through three entry points. 
Previously, only two cross-border entry 
points with Ukraine were available. 
However, a third Ukrainian–Romanian gas 
pipeline is planned in Romania’s energy 
strategy for 2007–2020 and 2011–2020; 
the latter is an updated version as of 2011. 
Romania already tried to diversify in the 
1990’s, but without success.141 The activity 
of the intermediary Rosukrenergo meant 
some diversification, but the first, however 
small real breakthrough is the 
interconnection between Hungary and 
Romania, which started to operate in 2010. 
Gazprom’s sales of gas to Romania are 
conducted through two intermediaries, such 
as the Swiss-based WIEE and Romania’s 
Conef Energy S.R.L. This will be unchanged 
for a good long time, since Gazprom signed 
long-term contracts in 2007 with the two 
companies effective until 2030. WIEE will 
supply 5 bcma of gas to Romania from 
2013, while, according to the contract, 
Conef has been supplied by 2 bcma since 
2010. 
The Romanian–Bulgarian interconnection 
is under construction. It could be put into 
operation in 2013. The building of an 
interconnection between Romania and Mol-
dova is also planned, to be operational by 
2013. In principle, an LNG regasification 
facility could be built in Romania in the 
frame of the AGRI LNG project (see my 
opinion on it below). The feasibility study has 
not been completed. 
5.11. Bulgaria 
Despite its favourable geographic location, 
Bulgaria buys gas only from Russia and has 
only one supply route at present through 
Romania.142 Bulgaria’s long-term gas supply 
                                                 
141 Stern (2005):117. 
142 During the January 2009 gas crisis, at the last 
minute, reverse flow from Greece to Bulgaria (and, 
as mentioned above, from the Czech Rebublic to 
Slovakia) became operational. The CEO of Bulgargaz 
said in October 2009 that they had concluded 
framework agreement with Greece to receive about 3 
mmcm of gas per day in case of an emergency, add-
ing that an agreement in principle also existed with 
Turkey’s Botaş for about 2 mmcm per day. (Accord-
ing to Bulgaria’s energy regulator’s 2012 annual 
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contracts are due to expire at the end of 
2012. The new contract should solve four 
problems.143 Firstly, gas should be cheaper 
than it is (introducing a spot component 
into the price formula, not only oil 
products). Secondly, intermediaries, such as 
WIEE and Overgaz, should be eliminated. 
Thirdly, the contract term should be shorter. 
Finally, of course, the possibility of re-export 
should be allowed. Bulgaria does not want 
to close itself by agreeing to a long-term 
commitment, but would rather open itself 
up to diversification opportunities, such as 
the domestic (mainly Black Sea) gas 
production, or gas through the planned 
interconnectors. However, apart from the 
Romanian–Bulgarian pipeline, there is no 
international project where the final 
investment decision has already been made. 
According to the draft Ten-year natural gas 
transmission and storage infrastructure 
development plan 2013–2022 of Bulgarian 
TSO Bulgartransgaz, published in September 
2012, the Interconnection Bulgaria–
Romania (IBR) is planned to be completed 
(and commissioned) in 2013, while the 
Interconnection Turkey–Bulgaria (ITB, from 
Malkoçlar to Lozenets) in 2014, the 
Interconnection Greece–Bulgaria in 2014-
2015, the Interconnection Bulgaria–Serbia 
(IBS) in 2015, and the CNG (compressed 
natural gas) facility in 2015-2016.144  
Before the gas crisis of January 2009, 
Bulgaria had already taken steps to buy 
Azerbaijani gas. The protocol of intention, 
signed in June 2008, envisaged the 
possibility of signing a contract for the 
supply of 1 bcma of gas to Bulgaria by 
Azerbaijan.145 In November 2009, a new 
element was added by the appearance of the 
                                                                          
report to the European Commission, 
“[c]orrespondence has been exchanged and a techni-
cal agreement is to be signed with Turkey.”) As to 
Bulgaria’s Energy Ministry, Bulgaria can receive 
more than 2.4 mmcm of (reverse flow) gas per day 
through the two cross-border pipelines, respectively, 
in an emergency. dnes.dir.bg (8 October 2009, 
http://dnes.dir.bg/news.php?id= 
5189791&tag_id=63160); Minisztersztvo na iko-
nomikata, energetikata i turizma na Reszpublika 
Balgarija (2012); Bulgargaz (2010); European 
Commission (2009). 
143 Following completion of this study, the new con-
tract was signed in November 2012. 
144 Bulgartransgaz (2012). 
145 Novinite.com. 4 June 2008. 
http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=93815 
possibility of the CNG option, besides the 
pipeline gas.146 Meanwhile, the goal to im-
port 2 bcma of gas was restored to 1 bcma 
(in addition to the volume to be pumped 
sometime in the future in the framework of 
the Nabucco project). Moreover, Azerbaijan 
would choose the land route through 
Turkey over the CNG option.147 Several 
deadlines have been set for the start of 
deliveries, but it has not come close to 
realisation, despite meetings and 
agreements.  
Bulgaria wants the Turkish–Bulgarian 
interconnection to be financed by the grant 
allocated from the EU’s European Energy 
Programme for Recovery (EEPR) funds, or by 
someone (including the Nabucco 
consortium), and it would be regarded as 
the first section of Nabucco West (see 
below). However, this will not work. In 
October 2012, the Bulgarian Prime Minister 
indicated that if it was not accepted, it 
would be built for only emergency needs 
before 2018, with an investment of about 
BGN 100 million (EUR 50 million) from 
Bulgartransgaz.148 Meanwhile, other 
                                                 
146 APA (13 November 2009, 
http://en.apa.az/news/111019); Tsakiris (2010); 
News.Az (16 November 2009, 
http://www.news.az/articles/2510/print) 
147 Economy News.bg (18 August 2010); News.Az 
(18 August 2010, 
http://www.news.az/articles/21211); Novinite.com 
(4 October 2010, 
http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=1207
87); Novinite.com (23 June 2011, 
http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=1295
78); Upstreamonline.com (17 August 2010, 
http://http//www.upstreamonline.com/live/article
226287.ece); Trend (17 August 2010, 
http://en.trend.az/capital/energy/1736279.html); 
Reuters (27 April 2012, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/04/27/bulgari
a-azerbaijan-gas-idUKL6E8FR3YX20120427); The 
Sofia Echo (25 September 2011, 
http://sofiaecho.com/2011/09/25/1162402_azerb
aijan-may-start-gas-deliveries-to-bulgaria-in-2013); 
Natural Gas Europe (15 November 2011, 
http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/bulgaria-and-
azerbaijan-finalise-gas-deal-3499); The Sofia Echo 
(3 April 2012, 
http://sofiaecho.com/2012/04/03/1800619_boris
sov-to-push-azerbaijan-georgia-bulgaria-gas-
transit-project-at-meeting-with-van-rompuy). 
148 Darik News (29 September 2012, 
http://dariknews.bg/view_article.php?article_id=97
0653); News.bg (8 October 2012, 
http://news.ibox.bg/news/id_2031338516); New 
Europe Online (9 October 2012, 
http://www.neurope.eu/article/borisov-lays-down-
conditions-nabucco); Bulgarian National Radio (10 
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information came to light. In September 
2012 the former head of Bulgaria’s state-
run gas supplier Bulgargaz announced that 
the Bulgarian government had already 
secretly signed protocols of intent with the 
Turkish company Setgaz to build an 
interconnector between the gas networks of 
the two countries. According to the 
announcement, the gas pipeline was to 
reach Stara Zagora in Bulgaria’s south and 
expected to be completed by the end of 
2014. Bulgartransgaz confirmed the news, 
adding that Setgaz’s project had a different 
concept and route from its own (i.e. the 
planned interconnection between Malkoçlar 
and Lozenets).149  
On the question of LNG, Bulgaria is not 
thinking of a Black Sea project.150 Rather it 
believes a CNG project would be 
appropriate there, with gas from 
Azerbaijan.151 The history of Bulgaria’s CNG 
plan began only in 2009. The fact that 
Azerbaijan prefers the use of Turkey as an 
export route rather than the Black Sea is not 
the only problem with the Black Sea CNG 
project. The CNG project clashes with the 
AGRI LNG (see below).152  
                                                                          
October 2012, 
http://bnr.bg/sites/en/Economy/Pages/1010NABU
CCOprojectbefore2018.aspx); News.Az (5 October 
2010, http://news.az/articles/economy/23965). 
149 Novinite.bg (12 September 2012, 
http://novinite.bg/articles/19561/Turska-firma-
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Novinite.bg (12 September 2012, 
http://novinite.bg/articles/19574/Bulgartransgaz-
i-Setgaz-shteli-da-stroyat-2-razlichni-gazoprovoda-
s-Turciya); Novinite.com (12 September 2012, 
http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=1431
72); Novinite.com (12 September 2012, 
http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=1431
79). 
150 Here, I do not deal with the issue of a 
South-East European regional LNG regasifi-
cation terminal in Greece. 
151 The Sofia Echo (22 September 2011, 
http://sofiaecho.com/2011/09/22/1161389_bulga
ria-may-help-georgia-in-joining-european-energy-
network); Novinite.com (3 April 2012, 
http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=1381
76). 
152 The Bulgarian media reported in April 2012 that 
Bulgaria’s Prime Minister had discussed the trans-
portation of LNG in Georgia. At that time, as a former 
Energy Minister, Traicho Traikov explained that the 
issue involved CNG rather than LNG, adding that, 
however, buying CNG would be much more expen-
sive than pipeline gas imports from Russia. Money.bg 
(3 April 2012,  http://money.bg/news/id_ 
5.12. Macedonia 
Macedonia buys gas only from Russia and 
solely through Bulgaria, having no other 
import capacity available. In 2012, 
Macedonia’s Makpetrol A.D. signed a long-
term gas supply contract with Gazprom Ex-
port for a period of 15 years.153 The gas 
market in Macedonia is underdeveloped and 
only a small part of northern Macedonia is 
gasified. There is no gas distribution 
network in the country at all. Natural gas is 
mostly used in industries (for final 
consumption) and by district heating 
companies (for heat production).154 
6) DIVERSIFICATION PROJECTS IN THE 
SOUTHERN CORRIDOR 
The Southern Corridor initiative155 includes 
routes going through and from Turkey and 
the Eastern Mediterranean as well as other 
routes that could pass the Black Sea (both 
pipeline as well as CNG and LNG options) to 
the EU. The Trans-Caspian Pipeline would 
also be a major project in the Southern 
Corridor to bring new sources of gas to Eu-
rope.156 South Stream is not part of the So-
uthern Corridor initiative. 
Apart from the delays, the common 
characteristic of the projects is that all Sout-
                                                                          
1670814083); Investor.bg (3 April 2012,  
http://www.investor.bg/ikonomika-i-politika/332 
/a/traikov-vnosyt-na-kompresiran-gaz-ot-
azerbaidjan-shte-struva-skypo,132524/). 
153 Gazprom Export – Gas market news. 27 Septem-
ber 2012. http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/ 
presscenter/news/682/. 
154 Bulgartransgaz (2012). 
155 The Southern Corridor would be – following the 
Northern Corridor from Norway, the Eastern 
Corridor from Russia, the Mediterranean Corridor 
from Africa and besides LNG – the fourth big axis. It 
aims at the transmission of gas from the Caspian 
Basin, Central Asia, the Middle East and the East 
Mediterranean Basin to the EU (European 
Commission, 2010, 2012). 
156 In September 2011, the EU adopted a mandate to 
negotiate a legally binding treaty between the EU, 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to build a Trans Cas-
pian Pipeline System.  
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hern Corridor projects, except naturally for 
the Trans-Caspian Pipeline and projects 
through and from the Eastern 
Mediterranean, bid for Azeri gas, namely 
gas from the second stage of the Shah Deniz 
field development (Shah Deniz 2). Azeri gas 
seems to be the only guaranteed source for 
Europe. Gas export is expected to start 
around the end of 2017.157 
Azeri gas has reached only Greece in Eu-
rope. Turkey re-exports a smaller amount of 
gas to Greece imported from Azerbaijan in 
the first stage of production of gas from the 
Shah Deniz field. The gas is imported 
through the Interconnection Turkey–Greece 
(ITG). The ITG project was a very important 
step. Signalling Washington’s support, the 
US Energy Secretary attended the 
inauguration ceremony in 2007.158 ITGI 
(Interconnector Turkey–Greece–Italy) 
comprises ITG and the IGI (Interconnector 
Greece–Italy) project, the latter including 
IGI Onshore and IGI Poseidon. 
Until the autumn of 2011, three projects, 
namely Nabucco, ITGI and TAP, were really 
involved in the gas game. Merger or some 
kind of cooperation of the competing 
pipeline projects in the Southern Corridor 
would have been obvious and these 
opportunities have arisen several times, 
mostly in 2011, but the different actors 
looked at the question differently, thus a 
positive result was not achieved. 
Since the autumn of 2011, important 
changes have occurred in the Southern 
Corridor, but the outcome is still far away. 
The first crucial change was when in 
September 2011 BP came up with the 
concept of the so-called South East Europe 
Pipeline (SEEP), which would have started in 
western Turkey and would have run across 
Bulgaria and Romania to Hungary’s eastern 
frontier, representing about a third of Na-
bucco’s length.159 The announcement came 
as a surprise; however, a BP top executive 
declared already in March 2011 that they 
were going to build a 10 bcma line into Eu-
rope that was expandable. “We’ve got to 
                                                 
157 The South Caucasus (Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum) 
Pipeline needs to be expanded. 
158 The New York Times. 19 November 2007. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/world/euro
pe/19greece.html?_r=1. 
159 Financial Times. 26 September 2011. 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ed9151b8-e84c-
11e0-ab03-00144feab49a.html. 
stop being preoccupied by the word Nabuc-
co,” he added.160 Shortly after the 
announcement, the Shah Deniz consortium 
received bids from Nabucco, TAP and ITGI 
by the 1 October 2011 deadline, and SEEP 
became a fourth possible option that would 
be looked at. Not much later, on 25 October 
2011, the so-called Izmir agreements were 
signed, including an agreement to sell gas to 
Turkey from Shah Deniz 2 and an 
agreement on the transit of gas from Shah 
Deniz 2 via the networks of the Turkish 
Botaş company.161 
The outline of the second crucial change 
started to materialise  in the Southern 
Corridor on 2 November 2011, when the 
deputy head of the State Oil Company of the 
Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) said a 
consortium would be created to build a new 
pipeline that would carry natural gas from 
the Shah Deniz 2 project through Turkey.162 
Two weeks later, the name of the new pro-
ject was revealed. On 17 November 2011, 
SOCAR announced that Azerbaijan and 
Turkey had started work on the Trans Ana-
tolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) project from 
Turkey’s eastern border to its western 
border.163 It was decided that the pipeline 
would have a capacity of no less than 16 
bcma, of which 10 bcma was destined for 
Europe and 6 bcma for Turkey’s western 
regions.164 Although SOCAR said this did 
not mean the end of the Nabucco project,165 
the situation was clear. The last remaining 
chance of the full-scale version of Nabucco, 
or Nabucco ‘classic’ that would have 
                                                 
160 Natural Gas Europe. 26 March 2011. 
http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/caspianeu-gas-
pipeline-10-bcm. 
161 News.Az (28 October 2011, 
http://www.news.az/articles/47744/print); 
News.Az (28 October 2011, 
http://news.az/articles/economy/47699); Eurasia 
Daily Monitor (Vol. 8, Issue 201, 1 November 2011, 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx
_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38603&tx_ttnews%5Bbac
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162 PanARMENIAN.Net. 2 November 2011. 
http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/news/82691/. 
163 Reuters. 17 November 2011. 
http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idA
FL5E7MH1W520111117?sp=true. 
164 PanARMENIAN.Net. 2 November 2011. 
http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/news/82691/. 
165 Reuters. 17 November 2011. 
http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idA
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included pipeline construction in Turkey 
was abolished. 
On 26 December 2011, a memorandum 
of understanding was signed concerning the 
construction of the TANAP pipeline, under 
which SOCAR, Botaş and TPAO (of Turkey) 
became the first members of the pipeline 
consortium. They stated that third-party 
international oil and natural gas companies 
would be allowed to join the consortium 
later during the construction process.166 The 
signing of the intergovernmental agreement 
(and the host government agreement) 
between Turkey and Azerbaijan was delayed 
until the end of June 2012. It was not easy 
to reach an agreement about it, but finally 
SOCAR’s shareholding remained at 80 per 
cent. Therefore, the Turks did not increase 
their stakes.167 SOCAR will keep 51 per cent, 
but the remaining 29 per cent will be 
distributed among potential partners such as 
(certain members of the Shah Deniz 
consortium, including) BP, Statoil and To-
tal.168 According to the plans, TANAP’s 
capacity could reach 16 bcma by 2020, 23 
bcma by 2023, and 31 bcma by 2026. The 
ultimate capacity of 60 bcma is an infinite 
perspective.169  
The Shah Deniz consortium has been 
conducting a three-round selection process 
among pipelines from the western border of 
Turkey. In the first round of the race, in 
February 2012, it chose the Trans Adriatic 
Pipeline over ITGI as a possible route, should 
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167 Bloomberg (29 March 2012, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-
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168 Bloomberg (6 September 2012, 
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169 Reuters (26 June 2012, 
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Financial Times – beyondbrics (12 July 2012, 
http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-
brics/2012/07/12/azerbaijan-total-gas-find-raises-
hopes-of-more-discoveries/#axzz2AAmXY1vG). 
it decide on the south of Italy as the 
destination. In the second round of the race, 
in June 2012, the Nabucco West project, an 
already scaled-down version of Nabucco 
‘classic’ was selected, rejecting the South 
East Europe Pipeline as the pipeline option to 
Central and South-East Europe. The Shah 
Deniz consortium is expected to make a 
final decision between Nabucco West and 
the Trans Adriatic Pipeline by mid-2013. 
Nabucco West was put into the public 
domain in mid-March 2012, but in February 
2012 it became known that a shortened pro-
ject had been considered. This version is not 
only shorter but also smaller in terms of 
capacity than the original one. Nabucco West 
is designed for an initial capacity of 10 bcma, 
which could be scaled up to 23 bcma. 
Initially, TAP is also planned to pass 10 bcma 
of gas that could be increased to 20 bcma.  
By this time, several negative messages 
had been received not only from Mol, the 
Hungarian participant, but also from the 
Hungarian government, RWE, Bulgaria, the 
EU and the US. Under such conditions, 
before the submission of proposal for Na-
bucco West to the Shah Deniz consortium, 
on 23 April 2012, the Hungarian Prime 
Minister indicated that Mol was leaving the 
project. Of course, Russia immediately 
welcomed the move. It turned out that Mol, 
or precisely FGSZ did not approve the 2012 
budget of Nabucco Gas Pipeline Internatio-
nal GmbH (Nabucco International 
Company). Having failed to pay a 
contribution, its share in the pipeline 
company reportedly fell.  
The history of Nabucco has been 
dragging on for ten years, and has been 
facing serious problems since the very 
beginning. It was in early May 2011 that 
the consortium once again decided to 
postpone the start-up. Nabucco Gas Pipeline 
International GmbH announced that it 
expected gas to flow first through the 
pipeline only in 2017, instead of 2015.170 
But the target date of 2015 was also the 
result of a multi-year delay. For example, 
the year 2009 was targeted in 2004, while 
                                                 
170 Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH – Press 
releases. 6 May 2011. http://www.nabucco-
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the year 2011 was considered to be the 
start-up year in 2005.171 
In early March 2010, European Energy 
Commissioner Oettinger did not rule out the 
possibility that the Nabucco consortium 
could decide in 2010 to back out of the pro-
ject altogether.172 In late March 2010, he 
believed the completion of the Nabucco gas 
pipeline might be delayed to 2018.173 In 
Hungary, where the issue has been totally 
politicised, finally, in July 2011, Mol 
Chairman-CEO Zsolt Hernádi admitted that 
there were serious problems, and they 
would spend more on it if the return was 
ensured.174 In October 2011, Hungary’s 
then Minister for National Development 
Tamás Fellegi also raised doubts about the 
viability of Nabucco, saying that the very 
optimistic cost scenario ran to around EUR 
24-26 billion.175 Although it was an 
accepted fact in expert circles that the 
planned EUR 7.9 billion Nabucco budget is 
underestimated, it received much attention 
when in February 2011, BP estimated the 
costs to be around EUR 14 billion. For 
example, Jonathan Stern could never see it 
costing less than EUR 12 billion.176 In early 
November 2011, Oettinger pointed out that 
Nabucco’s cost factor was EUR 10 billion or 
more and it was scheduled to transport the 
first supplies in 2017 or 2018.177 But BP’s 
February 2011 statement about the high 
costs and March 2011 statement about a 10 
bcma line can be looked at in a slightly 
different light if we consider its late 
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September announcement about the South 
East Europe Pipeline that came just before 
the 1 October 2011 deadline.178 In February 
2012, Oettinger approached the issue from 
a neutral position when saying that Nabucco 
was just one of the projects and he could 
live with any pipeline.179 It is important that 
the United States changed its policy towards 
Nabucco, and urged in mid-November 2011 
the Shah Deniz producers and SOCAR 
choose a smaller pipeline as the first 
pipeline that would be extendable.180 The 
US expressed pessimism about Nabucco 
once again in January 2012.181 RWE’s 
attitude has also changed because of cost 
pressures. In mid-January 2012, RWE 
mentioned that it could support other 
pipelines that had competed with Nabuc-
co.182 However, in May 2012, RWE declared 
that they continued to be convinced Nabuc-
co in its original shape was the best 
solution.183 
Shortly after the Hungarian 
announcements of April 2012, OMV of 
Austria, Transgaz of Romania and even 
Bayerngas of Germany, of which the latter 
began negotiations to become a member of 
the Nabucco consortium in October 2011, 
defended the project.184 Bulgaria, however, 
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was criticising the project. There does not 
seem to be any significance to the Bulgarian 
section of Nabucco being made a national 
project. Shortly before the Hungarian 
announcements, in early April 2012, 
Bulgaria’s Energy Minister said that by 2018 
the country would be able to rely on gas 
interconnections with Romania, Serbia, 
Greece and Turkey and on a major energy 
project, “be it Nabucco or something else.” 
Indeed, Nabucco is not included in 
Bulgaria’s Energy Strategy until 2020, 
which was adopted in June 2011. Bulgaria 
also made it clear that they would like to use 
the national gas transmission system rather 
than build a new pipeline for the project, as 
long as it would carry up to 10 bcm by 
2018.185 Soon after the Hungarian 
announcements, Bulgaria emphasised that it 
had no opportunities to implement the pro-
ject,186 adding, however, that Nabucco 
would probably be built sometime in the 
very, very distant future.187 Despite this, at 
the end of May 2012, Bulgaria’s 
representative in Nabucco Gas Pipeline In-
ternational GmbH considered the project as 
the most viable one aimed at connecting the 
Turkish gas market to Europe.188 While 
Bulgaria has been facing financial problems, 
building an interconnection with Turkey is a 
key for the country. 
In late July 2012, Azerbaijan’s Industry 
and Energy Minister declared that Nabucco 
West was the best option for piping natural 
gas from the Caspian Sea, considering “East 
and Central Europe” to be a more reliable 
market for Azeri gas.189 It was obvious that 
Turkey shifted its priority to its own TANAP 
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project from Nabucco,190 but, of course, 
Botaş, which is one of the six shareholders 
in Nabucco Gas Pipeline International 
GmbH, supports Nabucco West, assuming it 
to be the natural continuation of TANAP.191 
According to Jonathan Stern, the decision 
to court Caspian gas was first and foremost 
a political one.192 But buying gas is rather a 
market-driven decision. Jonathan Stern and 
Howard Rogers emphasise that Shah Deniz 
2 will be an important test case for new 
commercial, and specifically pricing 
frameworks in Europe.193 According to their 
information, the Europeans are willing to 
buy only at hub-based prices. E.ON 
Ruhrgas, which is one of the three 
shareholders in TAP with a 15 per cent 
stake, shares this view. It clearly stated well 
in advance that the company would only be 
interested in Azeri gas if the supply contract 
was competitive and had the right price 
formula, adding that the European utilities 
expected supplies from the Caspian to be 
priced to reflect conditions across the 
continent’s freely traded gas hub markets.194  
BP CEO Bob Dudley insists that the 
rationale for the decision on pipeline 
projects will be purely economic, so the 
tariff levels will decide the winner.195 It is 
important to note that the aim of SEEP was 
also to make the project cheaper. BP argued 
that without competitive pipeline offers, the 
sale of Shah Deniz gas to distant European 
markets would prove uncommercial.196  
The concept of the White Stream 
pipeline, a trans-Black Sea project 
(comprising of a Georgia–Romania route 
and later a Georgia–Ukraine route) is not 
discussed separately here, as I do not believe 
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it would be implemented. The AGRI 
(Azerbaijan–Georgia–Romania–Hungary 
Interconnector) project is also not 
considered to be on track. The seriousness of 
the project is merely given by the fact that 
SOCAR participates in it. Apart from TANAP, 
this still cannot be said of other projects. 
AGRI is a fresh project in the Southern 
Corridor; its story began in 2010. 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania and Hungary 
are partners in the project, but Hungary 
joined the partnership only in 2011. A 
number of countries and companies have 
reportedly expressed interest in the project, 
of these countries Serbia and Bulgaria are 
from the CEE region.197 The feasibility study 
for the AGRI project should be ready by late 
November 2012.198 
Should the Turkish gas imports from 
Azerbaijan increase and the Southern 
Corridor projects based on gas from and 
through Azerbaijan be realised, Georgia’s 
transit role would grow further. Through 
TANAP, Turkey will also function as an 
important transit state. The Trans-Caspian 
Pipeline, if ever built, would make 
Azerbaijan an important gas transit state as 
well.199 Nabucco ‘classic’ had a common 
legal framework that should have been 
applied throughout the whole route, 
including Turkey. But with TANAP, the 
situation has changed. While Turkey will 
play a key role as a transit state in the 
diversification of gas supplies to the EU, the 
European Commission fails to open the 
chapter on energy issues (Chapter 15).200 
Georgia and Turkey take part only as 
observers in the Energy Community. 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey are 
signatories to the 1994 Energy Charter 
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Treaty, and members of the Energy Charter 
Conference.  
7) CONCLUSIONS 
Since 2008, Gazprom’s market position has 
changed totally, while as a piped-gas 
exporter, Gazprom is locked into the Euro-
pean market. It has launched gas production 
in the Yamal Peninsula in such a difficult 
situation, and is about to start building the 
South Stream gas pipeline. And it is also in 
this situation that Gazprom faces an EU 
anti-trust probe, of which the most 
important issue is how gas is priced. Gazp-
rom wants prices that are independent of 
market conditions. But if it continues, Gazp-
rom will have more and more problems 
with gas exports. In order to avoid more 
arbitration, Gazprom recognised the need to 
narrow the gap between oil-linked contract 
prices and hub-based market prices. The 
series of concessions means that Gazprom is 
aware that the status quo cannot be 
maintained, but has not yet accepted the 
need to shift to hub-based pricing.201 
Central and East European countries can 
take very limited advantage of the benefits 
of the changed conditions and globalising 
gas markets.202 This is partly due to the lack 
of the necessary import capacity, and partly 
due to the long-term supply contracts. The 
Russo–Ukrainian gas crisis in early 2009, 
together with the period since 2008, help to 
illustrate the different opportunities each 
country faces. The two extremes were 
represented by Croatia and Poland. The most 
significant results were achieved by Croatia 
in reducing dependence on Russian gas. The 
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CEE region has not yet seen anything like it. 
However, it is obvious that Croatia’s 
participation in the South Stream project 
and the decision to construct a leg from the 
South Stream to Croatia mean that Croatia 
will buy gas from Russia in the future again. 
Despite various projects, Gazprom Export 
has an increased part in gas supplies in 
Poland thanks to the elimination of 
Rosukrenergo. These types of intermediary 
companies offered a certain degree of 
diversification also in Hungary and 
elsewhere for some time. Excluding Croatia, 
Slovenia is the least dependent on the 
Russian gas supplies and has the most 
diversified portfolio of gas importing 
contracts. The position of the Czech 
Republic and Hungary is worse than that of 
Slovenia, but long-term contracts with wes-
tern countries and spot markets for cheaper 
gas bring a certain degree of diversification 
to their portfolio. The January 2009 gas 
crisis was needed to force Slovakia to start 
diversifying and consider the security of 
supply measures, to have at least contracts 
with western suppliers and import capacity 
other than from Russia. With the exception 
of very small amounts of gas imports, Serbia 
purchases most of its gas from Russia. The 
rest comes from Hungary. Romania is also 
able to buy gas from Hungary and 
transferred through Hungary using the 
Hungarian–Romanian interconnector 
completed in 2009. Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Macedonia and the Baltic States 
are solely dependent on Russia for their gas 
supplies. However, physical reverse flow is 
possible for Bulgaria, as in the case of 
Slovakia.  
Nord Stream and South Stream create 
large additional capacity. Gas transit through 
Belarus and Poland are not at stake, but the 
Slovakian transit route has already been 
negatively affected. In the CEE region, South 
Stream dramatically rearranges the existing 
transportation and transit directions, thus 
some former investments may turn out to be 
unnecessary. It is important to emphasise that 
the Third Energy Package cannot be avoided 
by tactics when it comes to implementing 
pipeline projects with either Russian or non-
Russian participation. For example, it refers 
to both South Stream and the Hungarian–
Slovakian interconnector. 
Internal gas production in the CEE region 
has been steadily declining, so in countries 
where domestic gas plays a significant role in 
gas consumption, the degree of self-
sufficiency also has been eroding. 
Unconventional gas is considered to be a 
hope to bring competition to the Russian-
dominated markets and to lower gas prices. 
But one cannot predict the future of 
unconventional gas in Central and Eastern 
Europe. However, Black Sea gas is what 
Romania and as a follower, Bulgaria are 
focusing on in 2012. And it looks like the 
Polish shale gas euphoria is disappearing, 
thus opening up to the realties. In order to 
avoid not letting shale gas be a victim of PR 
failures, there are very strict rules that should 
be adhered to from the very beginning. 
Without following these principles, some 
countries will not even reach the point of 
determining whether or not they contain 
economically recoverable resources.  
A key question is to evaluate the extent of 
additional gas demand in the CEE region. 
But the forecasts are contradictory. The 
current economic conditions and 
uncertainties around energy policies are no 
help in planning, making predictions or 
decisions. 
Different countries have taken different 
steps to ensure the security of supply and 
the diversification since the early nineties 
and since the January 2009 crisis in 
particular, but the best is yet to come. The 
vision or the goal of energy independence, 
which has been communicated in certain 
CEE countries (e.g. in Hungary and 
Romania), is far off (the reality), regardless 
of what is to be understood by such 
statements. 
It can be seen that LNG regasification and 
pipeline projects are moving forward very 
slowly and are being delayed. Acting on a 
commercial basis, these can be accepted but 
greatly erode the credibility of those 
governments’ and companies’ commitments. 
In contrast to the large projects, the 
importance of interconnections is also 
emphasised. Hungary has taken significant 
steps in this area. But the case of the 
Slovakian–Hungarian interconnector 
showed clearly what options are available 
when considering a project that cannot be 
made on market terms. Looking at the 
region south of Hungary, very little has been 
done apart from the interconnections with 
Hungary. Nevertheless, demonstration of the 
possibility of diversification plays an 
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important role in diversification steps, even 
if only showing Russia that there are other 
options. 
To obtain the Azeri gas is a key. Since the 
autumn of 2011, important changes have 
occurred in the Southern Corridor, but the 
outcome is still far away. The South East 
Europe Pipeline and Nabucco West mean 
adaptation to the reality. The main problems 
with the ten-year old Nabucco ‘classic’ have 
not been solved, and even though progress 
has been made on some issues, new 
problems have arisen. SOCAR, holding a 
controlling stake in the Trans Anatolian Gas 
Pipeline, can be a guarantee for the Turkish 
project. Certain other members of the Shah 
Deniz consortium will also be shareholders 
of the pipeline. Nevertheless, one must 
remember in the future that Turkey is not 
an easy case to negotiate. Certain Shah 
Deniz shareholders will get shares in the 
pipeline that is to be selected to deliver gas 
from the western border of Turkey as well. 
Azerbaijan is the only definite supplier of 
gas to Europe in the Southern Corridor, but 
with high gas prices, European utilities will 
not stand in the queue for Azerbaijani gas. 
Also, it must be noted that diversification 
alone does not inevitably lead to supply 
security. And Azerbaijan has not yet 
demonstrated that it is a reliable supplier.203 
Among LNG regasification projects in the 
region, the Polish and Lithuanian projects 
are to be realised by 2014. The others are in 
planning stages. The increasingly protracted 
issue of a regional LNG terminal in the 
Baltic States has also shown how difficult it 
is to get any regional cooperation. In 
Lithuania, the LNG project is helped by the 
gas quota through the LNG terminal. 
However, in Poland, the maximum share of 
gas imported from one country has been set 
since 2000. This requirement is difficult to 
meet. 
Finally, although it is cliché, it must be 
mentioned again that Central and East Euro-
pean countries should put a much greater 
emphasis on energy efficiency. Campaign 
announcements are not enough anymore. 
 
     
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